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We present univariate and multivariate evidence to show that firms which engage in initial 
stock repurchases have some specific economic and financial attributes when compared to 
size-and  industry-matched  firms.  We  find  that  initial  repurchase  firms  are  younger,  have 
lower leverage and operating risk, and higher payouts, operating cash flows, profitability and 
market-to-book than matched non-repurchase firms. Compared to secondary or “seasoned” 
repurchase matched firms, these initial repurchase firms are also younger and have higher 
cash, profitability, sales growth and market-to-book, as well as lower payouts, leverage and 
retained earnings. Therefore, we analyze the determinants and motivations that may explain 
why firms repurchase their own stock for the first time by studying the theoretical hypotheses 
found in the financial literature that are most important in explaining initial stock repurchases. 
The  results  support  the  free  cash  flow  and  risk  reduction  signaling  hypotheses  and  the 
flexibility motivation for conducting stock repurchases. We do not find strong support for any 
other theoretical explanations of stock repurchases, such as undervaluation signaling, timing, 
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Stock  repurchases  are  an  important  financial  policy  instrument  that  affect  multiple 
corporate decisions, like payout, capital structure, investment and management compensation 
policies.  In  addition,  stock  repurchases  are  increasingly  important  transactions  in  most 
developed stock markets (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Ikenberry et al., 2000; Lafer, 2002; 
Grullon  and  Michaely,  2002),  as  several  empirical  studies  document  their  significant 
influence on the market valuation of a firm (including seminal works of Brigham, 1964; Elton 
and Gruber, 1968; Dann, 1981 and Vermaelen, 1981 and, more recently, for example, Grullon 
and  Michaely,  2004).  This  must  be  the  result  of  a  cost-benefit  analysis  of  all  financial 
decision makers involved, who prefer stock repurchases vis-à-vis alternative mechanisms of 
financial policy that achieve similar results or effects. 
In recent years stock repurchases have become an increasingly important instrument for 
distributing  cash  flows  to  stockholders,  as  stylized  facts  clearly  show  (Stephens  and 
Weisbach, 1998; Fama and French, 2001, Grulon and Michaely, 2002 and 2004, among many 
others). For instance, Grullon and Michaely (2002) report that in 1998, the total value of open 
market repurchases exceeded the value of dividends for the first time. Further, it has become 
relatively common for firms to initiate multiple repurchase programs over a relatively short 
period of time (Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003). However, compared to the subject of stock 
repurchases as a whole or to the dividend initiation decision, we know almost nothing about 
the timing, motives and determinant factors for firms to repurchase their stock for the first 
time (henceforth, initial repurchases).  
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of initial repurchase 
transactions  and  to  examine  the  validity  of  the  several  stock  repurchases’  theoretical 
hypotheses in explaining those initial transactions. To accomplish that, we use a matched-
pairs  methodology  to  develop  effective  univariate  and  multivariate  cross-sectional 
comparisons  (using  logistic  regressions)  between  initial  repurchase  firms  and  a 
contemporaneous  size  and  industry-matched  sample  of  both  secondary  repurchase  firms 
(firms that have repurchased stock more than once) and firms that have never repurchased 
their stock before. We argue that matched-pairs analysis enables us to analyze the differences  
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between initial repurchase firms and each one of their control samples. By doing so, we are 
able to test whether initial repurchase firms are significantly different from all other firms, 
repurchase firms or not. For that purpose, our analysis focuses on actual stock repurchases 
made by US firms that went public over the 1975-2002 period. 
We  present  univariate  and  multivariate  evidence  to  show  that  firms  which  conduct 
initial stock repurchases have some specific economic and financial attributes in relation to 
size-and industry-matched firms. Compared to matched non-repurchase firms, we find that 
initial  repurchase  firms  are  younger,  have  lower  leverage  and  operating  risk,  and  higher 
payouts,  operating  cash  flows,  profitability  and  market-to-book.  In  relation  to  secondary 
repurchase matched firms, initial repurchase firms are younger, have higher levels of cash, 
profitability,  sales  growth  and  market-to-book,  and  lower  payouts,  leverage  and  retained 
earnings. Therefore, we analyze the determinants and motivations that may explain why firms 
repurchase their own stock for the first time by studying the theoretical hypotheses found in 
the financial literature that are most important in explaining initial stock repurchases. The 
results support the free cash flow and risk reduction signaling hypotheses and the flexibility 
motivation for conducting stock repurchases. We do not find strong support for any other 
theoretical explanations of stock repurchases, such as undervaluation signaling, timing, tax 
effects and options and dilution hypotheses. 
The closest paper to our empirical analysis is Jagannathan and Stephens (2003). In this 
paper, the authors analyze the frequency of stock repurchases and investigate why some firms 
repurchase stock more often than others. Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) argue that it is 
reasonable to assume that the motivations behind a firm initiating repurchase programs on a 
frequent basis are different from an isolated, infrequent repurchase. We argue, similarly, that 
initial repurchases might be motivated by a different rationale from secondary repurchases 
and that they appear at a particular point in time due to some fundamental economic reasons. 
As  Jagannathan  and  Stephens  (2003),  we  expect  to  observe  significant  differences  in 
motivations and firm characteristics of firms that repurchased stock for the first time versus 
firms that repurchased for the second time or more (secondary repurchases) and versus firms 
that have never engaged in repurchase transactions. 
However,  our  analysis  is  different  from  theirs  at  least  in  three  aspects.  First,  their 
research question differs from ours. Their question is what determines the frequency of stock 
repurchases.  We  are  interested  in  testing  the  potential  dichotomous  nature  of  initial  and 
secondary repurchases, in addition to understanding why firms initiate a stock repurchase at a 
particular point in time. Second, Jagannathan and Stephens estimate an ordered logit model to 
investigate the types of repurchases, whereas we use logit models based on a matched-sample  
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analysis to focus on the differences in firms that repurchase their shares for the first time and 
both secondary repurchase firms and those firms that never repurchase any stock and not both 
samples at the same time. Third, we use actual repurchases (of all kinds, not only open-market 
repurchases),  avoiding  the  common  pitfalls  of  repurchase  announcements  (mentioned  by 
Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Dittmar, 2000; among others).
1 
We think that this study contributes to previous empirical studies in corporate finance, 
since this is the first study we are aware of that attempts to explain the initial repurchase 
decision. While considerable attention has been devoted in the financial literature to related 
subjects, such as dividend initiations or stock repurchases in general, perhaps surprisingly 
little  consideration  has  been  given  to  a  firm’s  decision  to  first  repurchase  its  own  stock. 
Furthermore, our results add to previous findings in the empirical literature in comparing 
between dividend payers or increasers or extra-dividend payers to stock repurchase firms or 
among firms that repurchase frequently, occasionally or rarely. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief 
review of the literature on stock repurchases, concluding by focusing on the absent role of 
initial  repurchases  in  that  literature.  Section  3  presents  our  hypotheses  and  empirical 
predictions.  Section  4  provides  information  about  data  and  methodology  used.  Section  5 
presents and discusses the empirical results and section 6 presents some final remarks and 
provides the conclusions. 
 
 




Early financial literature on stock repurchases was mainly empirical and focused on 
event-studies, which documented substantial positive stock price reaction to announcements 
of stock repurchases (e.g., Stewart, 1976; Dann, 1981; Vermaelen, 1981) and benefits for 
using a particular method for repurchasing stock (Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Kamma et al., 
1992; Lie and McConnell, 1998).  
Presumably,  the  most  cited  theories  of  stock  repurchases  as  a  whole  are  the 
                                                            
1 As Dittmar (2000) pointed out, examination of actual stock repurchasing activity (rather than announcements 
of repurchase programs) may be preferrable because changes in the announcements of repurchases do not always 
coincide  with  changes  in  actual  repurchases  (Stephens  and  Weisbach,  1998  show  that,  on  average,  firms 
repurchase between 74% and 82% of the shares announced as repurchase targets in open market repurchases). 
Further, Barth and Kasznick (2001) argue that the announcement should be an informative event, but the extent 
to which the announcement is anticipated by the market varies in time and across firms.  
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performance signaling (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985, among others) and free 
cash flow agency costs theories (e.g., Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986) according to surveys 
by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Dittmar (2000). These theories have been analyzed 
extensively  in  the  empirical  literature  on  financial  decisions,  including  stock repurchases, 
because they tend to be consistent with the most pervasive empirical findings. However, other 
theories have been labeled as truly important in explaining stock repurchases, such as the 
undervaluation theory (e.g., Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Ikenberry et al., 1995), the maturity 
theory (e.g., Grullon et al., 2002), the risk signaling theory (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2004; 
Lie, 2005), the dividend substitution hypothesis theory (e.g., Fama and French, 2001; Grullon 
and Michaely, 2002) and the equity market timing theory (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
Several empirical studies test the differential tax theory, related to both leverage and payout 
dimensions  of  stock  repurchases  (e.g.,  Barclay-Smith,  1988;  Dittmar,  2000).  Finally,  the 
options and earnings dilution hypothesis is put forth here as one more explanation for stock 
repurchases (e.g., Jolls, 1998; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Kahle, 2002). 
These theoretical explanations are consistent with several economic motivations (not 
mutually exclusive) that are usually found in the financial literature, including the existence of 
lower  than  target  debt  ratios  (e.g.,  Bagwel  and  Shoven,  1988;  Opler  and  Titman,  1996; 
Dittmar,  2000),  the  distribution  of  excess  cash  balances  (e.g.,  Guay  and  Harford,  2000; 
Jaganathan et al., 2000), the flexibility in distributing payouts (e.g., Jagannathan et al., 2000; 
Grullon and Michaely, 2002), a mechanism for takeover defense (e.g., Denis, 1990; Bagwell, 
1991) and for inside trading (e.g., Fried, 2001), several market microstructure effects (e.g., 
Brockman and Chung, 2001; Cook et al., 2003), managing earnings per share objectives (e.g., 
Badrinath et al., 2001; Bens et al., 2002), among other plausible motivations. In fact, it is 
quite likely that multiple objectives are contemporaneously driving managers’ decisions for 
repurchasing their own stock due to the fact that stock repurchases influence at the same time 
the capital and ownership structures, and financial policies related to incentive compensation, 
investment, financing and stockholder remuneration.  
Dittmar (2000) provides a detailed empirical test of these competing explanations and 
finds  support  for  some  of  these  explanations  at  different  points  in  time.  More  recently, 
Dittmar and Dittmar (2007) argue that the main force that drives the timing of the aggregate 
value of stock repurchases is the business cycle. 
 
 
2.2. Review of the Literature On Stock Repurchases 
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2.2.1. Signaling Hypothesis 
 
One  of  the  most  commonly  mentioned  explanations  for  the  existence  of  stock 
repurchase  transactions  is  the  signaling  hypothesis  or  the  information  content  of  stock 
repurchases  hypothesis.  In  effect,  signaling  theoretical  models  suggest  that  equity  flows, 
including  stock  repurchases,  may  convey  management’s  private  information  with  value 
relevance  from  insiders-managers  to  outsiders-investors  about  improvements  in  either  the 
firm’s future operating performance (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; John and 
Williams, 1985; Hausch and Seward, 1993) or firm’s future stock market performance (Ofer 
and Thakor, 1987). 
In  relation  to  the  case  of  stock  repurchases  as  a  signal  of  future  performance 
improvements,  the  rationale  is  that  repurchases  convey  information  about  operating 
performance  (high  operating  cash  flows  and  operating  profitability)  and  about  financial 
flexibility  (i.e.,  high  cash  levels  or  low  debt  ratios)  and  operating  risk  (low  volatility  of 
operating cash flows).
2 By using their private information, presumably managers can partially 
predict these two types of future performance improvements, and consider these predictions 
when  making  payout  decisions.  Therefore,  theoretically,  those  decisions  should  convey 
valuable information to investors.  
However,  the  empirical  evidence  on  whether  stock  repurchases  convey  information 
about future performance is mixed and inconclusive. For example, some studies find that 
stock  repurchases  convey  positive  information  about  future  operating  profitability  (e.g., 
Bartov, 1991; Jagannathan et al., 2000), while others find that they convey negative or no 
information about future performance (e.g., Bernatzi et al., 1997; Lie and McConnell, 1998; 
Grullon  et  al.,  2002).  Others  argue  that  signaling  models  generally  predict  that  payouts 
convey  information  about  future  cash  flow,  but  this  information  might  be  related  to  the 
stability rather than the average level of such flow (Jagannathan et al., 2000; Grullon and 
Michaely, 2004; Lie, 2005). Of these studies, Jagannathan et al., (2000) find that firms that 
increase  regular  dividends  exhibit  lower  volatility  of  operating  income  than  firms  that 
repurchase  stock,  and  both  groups  of  firms  have  lower  volatility  than  firms  that  do  not 
increase their cash distributions. Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Lie (2005) show that stock 
repurchases may contain valuable information regarding future operating risk. This evidence 
that the signal may be related to a decreasing trend in operating risk or financial risk is, really, 
                                                            
2 As argued by Lie (2003), if stock repurchases convey some information about future performance, it must be 
about changes in the level or certainty of future operating cash flows because higher cash levels and lower debt 
ratios  are  necessary  conditions  to  go  through  repurchase  transactions  without  having  to  forego  valuable 
investment opportunities or raise costly external finance.  
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another kind of theoretical explanation related to a firm’s lifecycle. The argument here is that 
the excess cash distributed by stock repurchases is no longer needed since these firms are now 
entering a more mature phase of their life cycle and, thus, have either high levels of cash 
balances, low debt ratios or even the expectation by managers of higher future operating cash 
flows far in excess of their growth opportunities.  
Moreover, empirical evidence also shows that there are differences between dividend 
increases  and  stock  repurchases  as  mechanisms  for  distributing  cash  to  stockholders.  For 
example, Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan et al., (2000) find that both firms that 
increase dividends and firms that repurchase stock exhibit a significant positive cash flow 
shock and a post-event higher performance, but these results are more permanent for firms 
that increase dividends. 
Finally,  the  signal  could  simply  be  that  the  firm’s  stock  is  currently  under-valued 
without  implying  necessarily  any  future  operating  cash  flows  improvements  in  terms  of 
magnitude  and  volatility  (Ofer  and  Thakor,  1987).  Most  of  the  early  literature  on  stock 
repurchases developed models and found empirical evidence consistent with this signaling of 
undervaluation,  irrespective  of  the  method  used  for  repurchasing  stock  (Dann,  1981; 
Vermaelen, 1981; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Ikenberry et al., 1995). More recently, some 
studies  document  a  decreasing  trend  in  the  average  abnormal  returns  related  to  stock 
repurchases (Lie, 2000; Jagannathan et al., 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Kahle, 2002) 
as Weston and Siu, 2002 point out.
3 
 
2.2.2. Free Cash Flow and other Agency Costs Hypotheses 
 
The agency theoretical models of stock repurchase decisions are largely based on the 
free cash flow problem (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986)
4. The separation of ownership and 
control  in  most  large  firms  may  lead  to  conflicts  of  interest  between  managers  and 
stockholders. When a firm has an excess of free cash flows (the cash flow available after all 
value creating operating and investment decisions), presumably, managers have the incentive 
to take value destroying decisions with purposes of entrenchment and extraction of private 
benefits.  In  other  words,  some  managers  may  over-invest,  perhaps  reflecting  managerial 
                                                            
3 Presumably, the use of stock repurchases during the stock crash of October 1987 was also explained by 
undervaluation.  Netter  and  Mitchell  (1989)  and  D’Mello  and  Schoff  (2000)  documented    two  supporting 
undervaluation signals: insiders in stock repurchasing firms were strong net buyers of their stock in that period. 
Therefore, managers had decided not only to repurchase stock, but also they invested in the stock as well. 
4 The Easterbrook (1984) arguments, usually labeled as monitoring hypothesis, are somewhat different from 
those of Jensen (1986), as they include both the dividend signaling and the free cash flow hypothesis points of  
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“hubris” (Roll, 1986), over-optimism (Heaton, 2002) or a preference for “empire building” or 
“perquisites”  (Jensen,  1986).  Alternatively,  managers  may  convey  their  intentions  of 
minimizing  wasteful  expenditures  by  committing  themselves to distribute cash out of the 
firm, for instance in the form of dividends or stock repurchases. As argued by Jensen and 
Meckling  (1976),  Grossman  and  Hart  (1982),  among  many  others,  paying  cash  to 
stockholders, through either regular and extra dividends or stock repurchases, alleviates the 
manager-owner agency problem by constraining managerial ability to finance activities that 
are  not  in  the  best  interests  of  stockholders.  In  addition,  these  cash  distributions  to 
stockholders  increase  the  likelihood  for  managers  to  face  the  scrutiny  of  the  stock  and 
corporate  control  markets  (“financial  markets’  discipline”),  the  competition  in  the  labor 
market  for  managers  and  the  pressure  of  financial  insolvency  (“debt  discipline”).  These 
effects are particularly noticeable in cases of large cash distributions, as is usually the case of 
stock repurchases.  
However, empirical research about stock repurchases (always combined with regular 
and special dividends) presents mixed evidence in support of the free cash flow hypothesis. 
For instance, Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Nohel and Tarhan (1998), Lie (2000 and 2005), 
Allen and Michaely (2002) have found evidence supporting the free cash flow  hypothesis. In 
contrast, Howe et al., (1992), Denis et al., (1994), Perfect et al., (1995), among others, find 
opposing  results,  claiming  that  there  may  exist  a  potential  negative  signal  of  cash  flow 
distributions associated with the lack of valuable growth options. 
But there are other agency costs theoretical models for stock repurchase decisions with 
explanatory  power,  related  to  management  entrenchment,  like  changing  stockholder 
composition and fending off takeovers (e.g., Schleifer and Vishny, 1986; Stultz, 1988; Sinha, 
1991;  Bagwell,  1991  and  1992),  inside  trading  (e.g.,  Fried,  2001),  external  managers 
monitoring  mechanisms  (e.g.,  Allen  et  al.,  2000;  Jagannathan  et  al.,  2000;  Grinstein  and 
Michaely, 2005) and expropriation of debt value (Myers, 1977, Dann, 1981; Kalay, 1982).  
According to Bagwell (1992), stock repurchases may be used as a takeover defense for 
two reasons. Firstly, the terms of a stock repurchase plan may be viewed more favorably than 
the takeover. Secondly, when a firm tenders for a percentage of its stock, the owners who 
offer their stock for sale are those with the lowest reservation prices. Hence, for a takeover 
bidder  to  succeed  with  the  remaining  higher  reservation  price  stockholders,  the  premium 
offered  will  have  to  be  higher.  This  required  higher  premium  may  deter  some  potential 
acquirers from making bids. Further, for instance, Stulz (1988) argue that, given the non pro-
rata attribute of stock repurchases, these transactions do increase the ownership percentage of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
view. He argues that dividends are an effective mechanism to keep firms dependent of financial markets and,  
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the firm for the non-sellers, which may well be the case of managers and other insiders (Lee et 
al., 1992 and D’Mello and Schroff, 2000 find empirical support for this). If the transaction is 
large enough, specially in the case of tender-offers, the incentives for managers to act like 
owners of the firm will be strengthened but their potential entrenchment behaviors may also 
damage the wealth of the remaining stockholders (Berger et al., 1996).  
Fried (2001) posits that stock repurchases, particularly through tender-offers, may be 
used  for  inside  trading  when  the  disclosure  rules  from  stock  market  regulators  are  not 
sufficient to prevent value transfers from outsider investors to insiders, which he shows is the 
case of the US market regulations. In fact, the legal regulations about stock repurchases of all 
developed markets analyzed by Lasfer (2002) are designed to prevent inside trading.  
The question is to know whether the mechanisms to avoid these situations are really 
effective, as Fried (2001) points out. The role of special stockholders in the resolution of 
agency  problems  with  strong  impact  on  payout  policies  is  another  important  issue  in 
explaining stock repurchases. Allen et al., (2000) and Jagannathan et al., (2000) document 
that  payout  policy  affects  institutional  ownership  because  institutional  investors  tend  to 
choose firms that are increasing payouts (they avoid non-dividend payers) but they prefer 
dividend increasers to stock repurchasers. Jagannathan et al., (2000) argue that this fact is due 
to  their  tax-status  (they  usually  are  tax-exempt),  while  Allen  et  al.,  (2000)  suggest  that 
dividend  payments  enable  institutional  investors  to  increase  the  market  value  of  their 
investments by providing monitoring benefits to these firms. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
and Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) show that institutional investors also prefer frequent 
repurchasers to the other repurchase firms.  
Finally, the wealth expropriation from creditors hypothesis related to payout decisions is 
usually labeled in the financial literature as the “milking-the-property” hypothesis (Galai and 
Masulis, 1976). This possibility does not find strong empirical support in the literature (Dann, 
1981; Handjinicolaou  and  Kalay,  1984),  in  spite  of  Maxwell and Stephens (2003) results 
consistent with some wealth redistribution effects. 
 
2.2.3. Dividend Substitution Hypothesis 
 
There are a number of non-mutually exclusive factors that potentially influence firms in 
their choice between dividends and stock repurchases.  
The first empirical study we know of on this subject is Vermaelen (1981), that analyzed 
the potentially different signaling role of stock repurchases and dividends. He argued that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
therefore, providing less costly monitoring for the stockholders.  
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stock repurchases are a better mechanism for sending irregular and totally unexpected signals 
to investors and for distributing larger amounts of cash, in a discretionary and timely manner, 
especially in situations of perceived strong stock undervaluation by managers. In contrast, 
cash dividends are an ongoing signaling mechanism that should be used for sending regular 
and periodic information to investors about expected future performance. In a similar point of 
view, Asquith and Mullins (1986) argue that stock repurchases and dividends are not perfect 
substitutes because stock repurchases tend to be larger and used less frequently. However, 
these studies were made when the repurchasing method most used were fixed price and dutch 
auction  tender-offers,  that  had  been  replaced  by  open-market  repurchases  since  the  early 
nineties (Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Lie and McConnell, 1998; Weston and Siu, 2002).  
The second wave of literature about the choice of the mix of payout instruments was 
related to the trade-off between the tax advantages of stock repurchases (as an increasing 
leverage and payout instrument) and the potential adverse selection and information costs 
associated  with  stock  repurchases  (Barclay  and  Smith,  1988;  Brennan  and  Thakor,  1990; 
Lucas and McDonald, 1998). According to these studies, dividends and stock repurchases are 
not substitutes and the composition of total payout depends on the degree of asymmetric 
information between managers and investors (Barclay and Smith, 1988; Brennan and Thakor, 
1990)
5 and the magnitude of both the amount distributed and the stock repurchase premium 
paid to investors (Lucas and McDonald, 1998). 
More  recently,  the  arguments  related  with  the  option  between  dividends  and  stock 
repurchases  turned  again  to  the  famous  old  question  of  “dividends  stickiness”  of  Lintner 
(1956).  In  this  context,  stock  repurchases  are  considered  flexible  cash  flow  distribution 
mechanisms relative to cash dividends because they do not implicitly commit the firm to 
future cash distributions. In contrast, cash dividends tend to be “sticky” (Lintner, 1956; Fama 
and Babiak, 1968; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Grullon and Michaely, 2002), meaning that 
they may represent an ongoing commitment to distribute cash flow to stockholders. In his 
famous paper, Lintner (1956) argued that firms pay dividends out of long-run and sustainable 
earnings  and  cash  flows  and  that  their  managers  are  very  reluctant  to  cut  dividends  and 
therefore to make a dividend increase that will subsequently have to be reversed. On the other 
hand, stock repurchases involve no such commitment, thus avoiding increases in financial 
risk related with periodic and compulsive distributions of cash flow (Grullon and Michaely, 
2002). In addition, firms sometimes announce stock repurchase programs but fail to meet the 
intended quantity targets of stock to be repurchased (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). In this  
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context, Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan et al., (2000), among many others, show 
that dividends are used to distribute permanent operating cash flows, while stock repurchases 
are used to distribute non-operating cash flows that are potentially temporary or operating 
cash  flows  that  are  not  likely  sustainable  in  the  long  term.  Given  all  these  facts,  stock 
repurchases  would  be  a  sensible  way  for  firms  to  distribute  cash  flows  that  have  a  high 
likelihood of not being sustainable, which explains why firms in some instances prefer stock 
repurchases  to  dividends.  Moreover,  in  their  application  of  Lintner’s  model,  Grullon  and 
Michaely (2002) find that repurchase yields have a negative effect on the dividend forecast 
errors. Supplied with this and other empirical results, they assume that those results mean that 
dividends and stock repurchases are substitutes.
6  
On the other hand, Fama and French (2001) and DeAngelo et al., (2002) find that a 
lower  propensity  to  pay  dividends  is  especially  motivated  by  a  changing  population  of 
publicly traded firms (higher proportion of newer and smaller firms with larger rates of capital 
and R&D expenditures and zero payouts). They also find that (net) stock repurchases are 
larger and more prevalent among dividend payers and that the rise in stock repurchases has 
taken place in firms that have also continued to pay dividends or have the characteristics of 
non-dividend paying firms. Therefore, they argue that stock repurchases have not substituted 
for cash dividends nor explain why the propensity to pay dividends has decreased, rather they 
provide  increased  flexibility  in  payouts.  Their  findings  appear  to  suggest  that  declining 
dividends are not being replaced by repurchases and that in fact stock repurchases are often 
complements  to  dividends  for  dividend  paying  firms,  given  the  fact  that  the  two  payout 
mechanisms perform different roles and business functions.
7  
Finally,  Dittmar  and  Dittmar  (2002)  argue  that  stock  repurchases  are  a  way  of 
distributing both transitory and permanent cash flows, while cash dividends are a way of 
distributing permanent cash flows. Thus, stock repurchases and dividends are both substitutes 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 For instance, Allen et al. (2000) argue that large, informed stockholders do not face this problem. They prefer 
stock repurchases, the least costly payout for them. Since institutions are likely to be more informed, the theory 
implies that they prefer firms that payout in the form of repurchases rather than in the form of dividends. 
6 Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggest that the introduction by the SEC of Rule 10b-18 in 1983 provided a safe 
harbor  protecting  repurchasing  firms  against  charges  of  stock  price  manipulation.  This  also  reduced  the 
likelihood that the IRS would tax repurchases at ordinary income tax rates like dividends. These, all together, 
increased  the  trend  into  dividends  substitution.  Weston  and  Siu  (2002)  observe,  however,  that, 
contemporaneously, the booming economy and financial markets greatly stimulated the use of employee stock 
options  and  the  anti-dilution  motive  for  stock  repurchases,  other  commonly  referred  motivations  for  the 
increasing use of stock repurchases. 
7 Weston-Siu argue that it “was the strong economy and rising stock prices that provided opportunities for the 
formation of new firms. The strong economy also made possible the growth in earnings in some of the larger, 
more mature firms. This enabled the traditional dividend paying group to increase payouts from rising earnings. 
In this environment, the growth of both dividends and share repurchases was stimulated by common factors: a 
strong economy associated with favorable performance and optimistic expectations of the future. But dividends 
and share repurchases perform different economic functions.”  
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and complements. When firms’ permanent cash flows increase, they may repurchase stock or 
increase dividends; thus, the two are substitutes. However, when firms have transitory cash 
flows, they use them only to repurchase stock. They stress, however, that these results are 
always  consistent  with  the  view  that  the  inherent  flexibility  of  repurchase  programs 
contributes to the dramatic fluctuation in stock repurchase activity. 
Even more recently, older arguments, referred to as the dividend clientele hypothesis, 
have  been  put  forward  with  some  (arbitrage  type)  changes  and  a  new  name  (“catering 
theory”),  which  suggests  that  the  composition  of  cash  distributions  is  influenced  by 
stockholder preferences for dividends. There is both empirical (e.g., Bajaj and Vijh, 1990 and 
Denis et al., 1994 for the clientele hypothesis and Baker and Wurgler, 2004 for the catering 
hypothesis) and theoretical (Allen et al., 2000; Baker and Wurgler, 2004) support for these 
explanations  for  payout  mix  choices,  although  some  studies  do  not  support  them  (e.g., 
Michaely et al., 1995; Hoberg and Prabhala, 2005; Osobov and Denis, 2006). 
 
2.2.4. Differential Tax Rates Hypothesis 
 
The differential tax rate hypothesis is one plausible explanation of stock repurchases. 
According to Copeland and Weston (1988), this hypothesis is related with two models: the 
leverage tax shield model and the dividend tax avoidance model. In relation to the former 
model, if the stock repurchase is financed by issuing debt or even by distributing excess cash, 
the  stock  repurchase  firms will capture tax savings because the income before taxes will 
decrease. The latter model points out that although the US tax system treats dividends and 
stock repurchases in the same way at the corporate level (after 1986), stock repurchases are 
generally tax-advantaged at the personal level (lower tax rate and flexibility in the timing of 
the payment of capital gain taxes). The magnitude of this advantage will depend on several 
specific investors’ attributes (e.g., personal costs, marginal tax rates and the timing horizon of 
the stock investment), which are not generally public information.  
However, some authors cast doubts about these theoretical tax explanations. First, one 
may argue that there are other mechanisms in addition to stock repurchases which enable 
firms to increase their debt ratios and take advantage of debt tax shields. Old empirical studies 
like Masulis (1980) and Vermaelen (1981) show that, at best, only a small proportion of the 
abnormal returns of stock repurchase announcements could be associated with the increased 
tax shields of debt. Further, not all classes of stockholders have tax preferences for capital 
gains and stock repurchases vis-à-vis dividends (e.g. firms and tax exempt investors). As 
argued by Jagannathan et al., (2000), it seems unlikely that taxes explain the more recent  
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increase  in  repurchase  activity,  since  the  tax  advantage  of  repurchases  was  substantially 
reduced  after  1986,  before  the  beginning  of  the  large  repurchase  waves  of  the  nineties. 
Dittmar (2000) also found little support of the dividend tax avoidance model.  
 
2.2.5. Maturity Hypothesis 
 
The maturity hypothesis, first put forward by Grullon et al., (2002), is a life cycle based 
explanation for cash flow distributions to stockholders and their related stock price effects 
that is an alternative to the performance signaling hypothesis. Grullon et al., (2002) find that 
changes in dividends are significantly negatively related to changes in systematic risk, with a 
strong  component  of  business  risk,  growth  and  operating  cash  flows.  They  propose  an 
explanation for these findings, which they refer to as the maturity hypothesis. Further, Grullon 
and Michaely (2004) document a similar relationship for stock repurchases, which may also 
signal a decrease in systematic risk.  
According to the maturity explanation of equity flows, dividend increases and other 
cash payouts are a logical result from changes in a firm's life cycle. The key idea is that as 
firms become more mature, they tend to increase their cash flow distributions to stockholders 
and reduce their reinvestment rates, in response to lower value creating growth options and 
investments available and consequent rise in free cash flow and excess cash.  
Grullon et al., (2002) also argue that the decline in the proportion of total assets market 
value  associated  with  future  growth  opportunities  or  growth  options  (and  increase  of  the 
proportion of value related to assets in place) is the main cause for the decreasing trend in 
business and operating risk. This maturity hypothesis provides some support for the free cash 
flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986). The mature firms that generate large free cash flows in 
response to a reduction in investment capital expenditures are more likely to distribute these 
free cash flows to their stockholders. However, the potential for their management to over-
invest  is  very  high  (Jensen,  1986).  Therefore,  stock  repurchases  may  not  only  convey 
information about changes in the firms’ expected future (low) performance and decline in risk 
but also about the potential management's commitment not to over-invest. Thus, as argued by 
Grullon et al., (2002), the free cash flow hypothesis becomes a significant element of the 
maturity hypothesis, as it specifies which firms are likely to generate large free cash flows and 
face this type of agency conflict.  
 
2.2.6. Timing Hypothesis 
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In a line of the literature related to capital structure, Baker and Wurgler (2002) propose 
a market timing theory of capital structure, which can be directly applied to stock repurchase 
decisions as an instrument of financial policy.
8 They argue that a firm’s capital structure is the 
cumulative  result  of  attempts  to  time  the  equity  market.  This  hypothesis  posits  that  the 
repurchasing firms are capable of detecting when the market undervalues their stock. Baker 
and  Wurgler  (2002  and  2004)  find  supportive  evidence  by  documenting  that  leverage  is 
significantly related to the market-to-book ratio. They conclude that (low leverage) firms raise 
capital when market-to-book ratios are high and, conversely, repurchase their stock or issue 
debt when market-to-book ratios are low. Survey evidence by Graham and Harvey (2001), 
Baker et al., (2003) and Brav et al., (2005) also strongly suggest that managers try to time the 
equity market. Of course, this could be the result of those firms’ managerial over-optimism 
(Heaton, 2002). More recently, Dittmar and Dittmar (2007) show that several market timing 
measures do not explain aggregate stock repurchase activity, which seems to be influenced by 
changes in the business cycle. 
 
2.2.7. Options and Dilution Hypothesis 
 
Although  there  is  no  strong  theoretical  basis  for  this  fact,  recent  empirical  studies 
present  results  that  are  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  a  major  motive  for  firms  to 
repurchase stock has been to offset the dilution effects of the exercise of stock options (Jolls, 
1998, Weisbenner, 1998; Kahle, 2002; Bens et al., 2002). This motivation is also vehemently 
stressed in recent surveys to financial managers (Badrinath and Varaya, 2000; Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Baker et al., 2003; Brav et al., 2005). The existence of employee stock options 
(ESOPs) could influence the composition of cash flow distributions for several reasons. First, 
they create incentives for stock repurchases (rather than dividend payments) because the value 
of an option declines when a stock goes ex-dividend (as the stock price decreases) but not 
when a firms repurchases its stock (as the stock price may even increase). Second, managers 
prefer to use repurchased stock rather than newly-issued stock for ESOPs to avoid diluting 
earnings  per  share  (Weisbenner,  1998),  in  particular  when  options  are  more  likely  to  be 
exercised  (Kahle,  2002).  Furthermore,  when  the  earnings  growth  targets  of  firms  are 
threatened, they are more likely to increase stock repurchasing activities (Bens et al., 2002), 
especially firms with high price-to-earnings ratios (Kahle, 2002). Recent empirical work by 
                                                            
8 Since the works about IPOs of Ritter (1991) and Loughran-Ritter (1995, 1997), who used this term, another 
name commonly used to describe this behavior is “windows of opportunity”. However, Baker-Wurgler (2002) 
argue that, unlike the so-named “windows of opportunity hypothesis”, the equity market timing hypothesis does 
not require the existence of adverse selection costs that tend to vary across firms and time.  
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Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) shows, however, that there are no significant differences in 




2.3. The Financial Literature and Initial Stock Repurchases 
 
The  purpose  of  the  next  section  is  to  determine  what  are  the  existing  theoretical 
hypothesis that could explain the initial repurchase decision. Therefore, one important issue 
must be stressed previously.  
The  absence  of  any  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  on  ﬁrms’  decisions  to  first 
repurchase their stock stands in sharp contrast to the strong flow of empirical literature on 
stock repurchases, especially since Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981). There has also been 
some interest in the literature on the timing of dividend initiations (Healy and Palepu, 1988; 
Michaely et al., 1995; Benartzi et al., 1997; Bulan et al., 2006), in contrast to the little, if any, 
attention  that  has  been  devoted  to  ﬁrms’  decision  to  initiate  stock  repurchases.  The  only 
empirical work we are aware of about initial stock repurchases is an unpublished event study 
from Gesser et al., (2005), with clearly different objectives from this work. They want to test 
the  wealth  effects  related  to  unanticipated  stock  repurchases.  Hence,  they  define  a  stock 
repurchase  as  an  initial  repurchase  when  a  firm  initiates  stock  repurchases  after  four 
consecutive  years  with  no  repurchase  transactions,  arguing  that  in  these  cases  the 
announcement of the stock repurchase should be unanticipated by the market.  
 
 




The purpose of this section is to determine what existing stock repurchases financial 
theories imply specifically about the likelihood of the initial repurchase decision. 
Our primary research objective is to provide insights into why firms repurchase their 
own  stock  for  the  first  time  at a particular point in time. We start by examining several 
alternative theoretical hypotheses and economic motivations found in the financial literature 
to explain the stock repurchase decision as an alternative mechanism for distributing cash  
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flow. We must do this, since the literature provides no specific theory to indicate when a firm 
will initiate stock repurchase transactions for the first time.  
Some researchers studying dividend initiation decisions (e.g., Bulan et al., 2006; Kale et 
al., 2006) claim that dividend initiation is a unique event in the life cycle of a firm that 
represents  a  significant  change  in  a  firm’s  financial  policy.  In  particular,  these  dividend 
initiation studies show that life cycle factors are fundamental to the initiation decision and 
occur when firms have reached the mature stage of their life cycles. Also, other literature 
shows that some firms repurchase stock frequently because they are large, mature firms with 
free cash flow problems (Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003). We expect different results for 
initial stock repurchase firms. Therefore, the overall base case for the hypotheses mentioned 
below  will  be  the  prediction  of  the  “uniqueness”  of  initial  repurchases,  at  least  in  some 
financial attributes that could lead us to somewhat different theoretical explanations vis-à-vis 
the behavior of both secondary repurchase firms and non-repurchase firms.  
Therefore, we will examine the differences between firms that repurchase stock for the 
first time and all other firms with similar size and industry attributes in order to confirm 
whether  initial  repurchases  are  distinctly  different  from  other  repurchases  (not  simply  a 
particular  type  of stock repurchase). We argue that explaining why some firms decide to 
repurchase their stock for the first time requires an understanding of why some do not and 
why some similar firms are already repurchasing.  
 
3.2. Hypothesis About Determinants of the Likelihood of Initial Repurchases  
 
The  several  theoretical  hypotheses  presented  in  the  last  section  make  a  number  of 
empirical testable predictions regarding the likelihood of stock repurchases in general and, 
although they have no such predictions for initial repurchases, we are going to adapt them 
here for that purpose. 
 
3.2.1. Signaling Hypothesis 
 
The performance signaling theory assigns an informative role to stock repurchases and 
posits  that  firms  will  repurchase  their  stock  when  they  have  good  prospects about future 
operating performance. This theory implies that repurchasers will have higher profitability 
and larger operating cash flows in the future. There is no strong argument to support different 
roles for secondary and initial repurchases in this matter, meaning that the two types of firms 
may  present  stronger  cash  flow  and  profitability  improvements  than  the  non-repurchasers  
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control  sample.  According  to  the  signaling  hypothesis,  as  stock  repurchases  convey 
information  to  the  market,  initial  repurchasers  are  expected  to  have  higher  levels  of 
asymmetric  information  than  non-repurchasers,  even  holding  size  constant.  Additionally, 
being an unexpected transaction, an initial repurchase would be more likely for firms with a 
higher degree of information asymmetry. Consequently, we expect that these firms would 
present  higher  growth  and  operating  income  volatility  than  both  secondary  and  non-
repurchase  firms.  Therefore,  they  may  repurchase  stock  to  signal  future  operating  risk 
decreases. 
It is very well documented in the literature that the amount of information available to 
firms and the degree of accuracy of the market valuation of firms may affect their stock 
repurchase decisions. However, as Dittmar (2000) points out, information asymmetry is not a 
sufficient  condition  for  firms  to  be  undervalued  and  it  is  not  possible  to  determine  with 
certainty whether a firm’s stock is undervalued. One indication of undervaluation is a history 
of low returns. If the undervaluation signaling hypothesis drives initial stock repurchases, then 
we expect to find that firms initiate stock repurchases after periods of low returns and that 
these transactions should be followed by high future returns. The underlying assumption is 
that  low  past  returns  indicate  relatively  low  past  valuations  and  that  high  future  returns 
represent a market correction of past misvaluation (as investors realize that managers are 
seeking to repurchase stock to take advantage of this potential undervaluation in the stock 
price).  
Dittmar (2000) argues that since historical returns are a backward-looking measure of 
valuation, they may not detect current undervaluation. Also, Ikenberry et al., (1995) show that 
firms with low market-to-book ratios earn abnormal returns in subsequent periods, meaning 
that market-to-book ratios may indicate undervaluation, especially if growth opportunities are 
held constant. As this is presumably the case in the matched-pairs analysis, we posit that firms 
with  lower  market-to-book  ratios  should  also  have  a  higher  likelihood  of  initiating  stock 
repurchases. 
 
3.2.2. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
 
The  free  cash  flow  theory  states  that  low  growth  firms  with  limited  investment 
opportunities are more likely to have higher free cash flows and therefore incur higher equity 
agency costs because managers of those firms have the incentive to invest in value-destroying 
assets and activities. This agency theoretical framework predicts that managers can commit 
themselves to minimizing those wasteful expenditures by adopting a policy of distributing  
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excess free cash flows, for instance, through stock repurchases. Apparently, the free cash flow 
theory makes similar predictions for initial and secondary repurchases. In fact, maybe this 
study of the initial repurchase will offer additional empirical support for the predictions of 
free cash flow theory of repurchases. This would be the case if the initial repurchase has no 
specificity  in  relation  to  secondary  repurchases  in  this  context.  The  predictions  for  the 
likelihood of stock repurchase decisions, both initial and secondary repurchases, are that they 
are negatively related to the firms’ future growth options and discretionary expenditures and 
positively related to the existing amount of cash (and negatively related to leverage), cash 
flows and profitability. We argue, however, that this may well be the case for secondary 
repurchasers  but  not  necessarily  for  initial  repurchases.  We  should  expect  that  initial 
repurchasers  may  be  growth  firms  which  are  more  likely  to  suffer  from  information 
asymmetry due to the uncertainty about future growth, rather than suffer from free cash flow 
problems. Thus, those firms with larger growth options and greater discretionary expenditures 
should be more likely to initiate repurchases for the first time.
9 
 
3.2.3. Dividend Substitution Hypothesis 
 
Some literature (e.g., Guay and Harford, 2000 and Jagannathan et al., 2000), document 
that dividends are used to distribute permanent cash flows while stock repurchases are used to 
distribute transitory cash flows, as is the case of non-operating cash flows. Stock repurchases 
should play an important restructuring role by enabling management to distribute cash in a 
timely manner. Therefore, we should expect a positive relation between non-operating income 
and stock repurchases likelihood. However, we do expect some differences between the initial 
and secondary repurchasers samples. In fact, we anticipate a weaker relation between non-
operating income and stock repurchases in the case of initial repurchases, although we may 
find a somewhat stronger positive relation than in the case of the non-repurchasers control 
sample (in particular for the initial repurchases’ sub-sample of non-dividend payers), because 
we predict that distributing transitory cash flows may not be as strongly motivating for initial 
stock repurchases as it may be, on average, for secondary repurchase firms. This prediction 
means that the likelihood of the substitution effect between dividends and stock repurchases 
for  initial  repurchase  firms  (in  relation  to  secondary  repurchase  firms)  will  have  lower 
strength. 
                                                            
9 We also note that agency considerations may imply that managers wish to avoid personal costs of financial 
distress.  They  have  the  incentive  to avoid paying out dividends, especially if they expect higher cash flow 
variability  in  the  future.  No  such  prediction  seems  valid  for  stock  repurchases  (both  initial  and  secondary 
repurchases) in face of their “non-stickiness”.  
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The  financial  flexibility  question  that  drives  most  of  the  dividends-repurchases 
substitution debate is not only related to the degree of predictability of cash flow but also with 
the amount of future investment opportunities and the magnitude of operating and financial 
risk.  Firms  with  higher  growth  options  face  not  only  more  profitable  investment 
opportunities,  but  also  greater  uncertainty  about  the  level  of  profitable  investment 
opportunities, and hence they should rely more on stock repurchases rather than dividends to 
distribute cash to stockholders because in this case firms may require a more flexible payout 
policy. Also, higher volatility of operating income should reduce dividends and significantly 
increase  the  mix  of  cash  flow  distributions  made  through  stock  repurchases.  Again,  we 
hypothesize that these relations will be more pronounced for the initial repurchases sample 
than  for  the  secondary  repurchases  sample,  in  particular  for  the  initial  repurchases’  sub-
sample of non-dividend payers. This prediction means that these higher growth and operating 
risk attributes will increase the likelihood of the substitution effect between dividends and 
stock repurchases for initial repurchase firms in relation to secondary repurchasers. 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) find a substitution effect between dividends and open 
market stock repurchases. They do not state that firms have been cutting dividends to replace 
them with repurchases. They find that large, dividend paying firms have been repurchasing 
stock rather than increasing dividends and that much of the growth in popularity of stock 
repurchases is due to those large dividend paying firms. Also, Fama and French (2001) argue 
that the lower propensity to pay dividends is motivated by younger, smaller firms with higher 
rates of capital and R&D expenditures, that do not pay dividends but which may repurchase 
their stock. Consequently, we should expect that initial repurchasers are likely to be firms as 
described by Fama and French (2001) and hence different from firms that have traditionally 
paid significant dividends (which would be more similar to secondary repurchasers). This 
special role of initial repurchases in the question of dividends substitution may also be tested 
by  analyzing  the  number  of  dividend  payers  and  non-dividend  payers  that  initiated  stock 
repurchases for the first time and the proportions of increases and decreases in dividends for 
both  groups  and  comparing  those  figures  with  the  ones  extracted  from  the  samples  of 
secondary repurchases.  
All  these  expected  results  should  contribute  to  check  whether  both  types  of  stock 
repurchases  present  distinct  roles  in  the  dividends-repurchases  substitution  question,  thus 
supporting  (at  least  partially)  the  “uniqueness”  of  initial  stock  repurchases  in  relation  to 
secondary repurchases. 
 
3.2.4. Differential Tax Rates Hypothesis  
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Stock repurchases may also be preferred over dividends as a mechanism of cash flow 
distribution  due  to  the  personal  tax  rate  advantage  of  capital  gains.  If  initiating  stock 
repurchases is a tax-efficient alternative to cash dividends distribution, we should expect that 
stock  repurchases  should  be  negatively  related  to  dividend  payout  ratios.  Also,  stock 
repurchases reduce equity and increase debt ratios. These two latter effects reduce the tax 
burden of repurchase firms. Therefore, we expect that firms are more likely to repurchase 
stock for the first time if they have lower debt ratios that are increasing over time. In this 
context, if the motivation for initiating stock repurchase transactions is to benefit from these 
two stock repurchase tax advantages, then we predict lower and increasing debt ratios and 
lower payouts for initial repurchase firms in relation to non-repurchase firms. There are no 
strong arguments to distinguish initial and secondary repurchases in this differential tax rates 
question. 
 
3.2.5. Maturity Hypothesis 
 
 
The maturity hypothesis predicts that firms would repurchase their stock upon reaching 
the  mature  stage  of  their  life  cycle,  when  they  are  faced  with  high  cash  flows  and  low 
investment opportunities. Abstracting from agency conflicts considerations, this hypothesis 
implies  that  stock  repurchases  are  associated  with  subsequent  declines  in  profitability, 
operating cash flow, growth, cash balances and operating risk. In this context, our hypothesis 
about  the  potential  uniqueness  of  initial  stock  repurchases  may  have  here  a  special 
opportunity to be tested. Indeed, we anticipate that the maturity label associated with stock 
repurchases  is  not  valid  for  initial  repurchases  but  only  applies  to  subsequent  repurchase 
transactions. Therefore, we expect that the maturity hypothesis effects may well be confirmed 
in the sample of secondary repurchase firms but not in the sample of initial repurchase firms. 
In  other  words,  we  do  not  expect  maturity  attributes for initial relative to both non- and 
secondary-repurchasers’ samples.  
We will also test the lifecycle theory by using the variable used by DeAngelo et al., 
(2005)  in  analyzing  the  maturity  hypothesis  for  dividend  payers  (the  mix  of  earned-
contributed  capital)  to  assess  whether  firms  with  relatively  low  retained  earnings  as  a 
proportion of total assets are more likely to repurchase stock for the first time in opposition to 
what tends to occur with secondary repurchasers. Obviously, initial repurchasers may choose 
to repurchase in order to distribute excess cash balances. However, recent empirical studies of  
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corporate cash holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Harford, 1999; Custódio et al., 2006) find that 
firms  with  stronger  growth  opportunities,  riskier  cash  flows,  and  more  limited  access  to 
capital markets hold higher cash balances. These attributes are among the ones that we expect 
for  initial  repurchasers.  Of  course,  plausibly,  firms  with high  levels of (excess) cash and 
operating cash flow may be more likely to initiate stock repurchases, but we do not assume 
this to be a sign of entering into a more mature phase of life. We expect that the proxies used 
for cash and cash flow will be weakly related to the decision to initiate stock repurchases, 
holding growth options constant. We also do not expect significant decreases in profitability, 
operating cash flow, growth and operating risk. Finally, although one should consider it as a 
natural result, we expect that initial repurchasers will be younger than secondary repurchasers. 
 
3.2.6. Timing Hypothesis 
 
According to this hypothesis managers attempt to time the market when taking financial 
decisions such as issuing securities and distributing cash flows. Therefore, firms will tend to 
repurchase stock (increase leverage) when market valuations are at low levels (and to raise 
equity capital when market valuations are at high levels). In reality, if this market timing 
theory holds, we should expect that initial stock repurchasers would present low prior stock 
returns and increases in their market-to-book ratios and debt ratios. We expect that this would 
also occur for the secondary repurchasers sample.  
 
3.2.7. Options and Dilution Hypothesis 
 
Financial literature observes that managers have incentives to avoid earnings dilution 
and  reporting  earnings  disappointments  and  hence  take  decisions  to  preserve  their  firms’ 
reported earnings per share and stock prices. These decisions may help us to explain stock 
repurchase  decisions,  especially  when  these  managers  hold  stock  options.  Thus,  in  this 
context, we expect that firms with a larger proportion of stock options may repurchase more. 
This should apply to both initial and secondary repurchases. However, since we hypothesize 
that initial repurchases are generally implemented by growth firms with high operating risk, it 
is likely that those firms may have a significant number of long term options that should not 
be exercised in the short run and thus stock repurchases may not be necessary to remove the 
dilution effects of the exercise of these options. Thus, although stock repurchases may be 
associated with the use of stock options for incentive compensation, using them to avoid 
dilution is less likely to occur for firms with high growth of earnings per share, as may be the  
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case for initial repurchasers. In other words, we anticipate that initial repurchasers will have 
higher operating volatility and earnings per share growth relative to non-repurchasers and 




To summarize, we hypothesize that initial repurchases may be undertaken by firms that 
are  more  likely  to  be  under-valued  and  with  a  potentially  high  degree  of  asymmetric 
information. Therefore, for initial repurchasers, we shouldn’t find empirical support for other 
valid explanations for secondary repurchases such as the free cash flow hypothesis (absence 
of excess cash flows in relation to growth options), maturity hypothesis (no expected decline 
in growth and operating risk), the substitution hypothesis (different characteristics between 
initial repurchasers and cash dividend payers) or option and dilution considerations. In that 
sense, signaling, timing, options and undervaluation are more likely motives for initial stock 
repurchases, since it is doubtful that firms could credibly signal that they are undervalued or 
that their operating performance is going to improve on a frequent basis (Jagannathan et al., 
2003).  This  allow  us  to  posit  that  initial  repurchases  are  driven  by  different  theoretical 
explanations relative to secondary repurchasers, with prevalence of undervaluation, options, 
timing and performance signaling considerations at the expense of free cash flow, maturity or 
other  theories.  Table  1B  (page  28)  summarizes  these  hypotheses  in  terms  of  expected 




4. Data and Methodology 
 
4. 1. Sample Selection and Data Collection 
 
The data for this study came from the Compustat database for the period 1975 through 
2004, inclusive (henceforth data item shown in parentheses). We used this dataset to collect 
all firms’ financial statement data, stock returns and industry (as defined by their 4-digit SIC 
code) and to determine the ﬁrms’ age at the time of their initial repurchase.  
In  this  study,  we  analyze  the  determinants  of  initial  stock  repurchases  and  we 
empirically examine the extent to which firms formulate that decision according to the most 
frequently  mentioned  theoretical  models  of  financial  policies  and  decisions.  We  focus on  
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actual stock repurchases and track a sample of 1,247 firms which went public after 1975, and 
that initiated stock repurchases in the period of 1980-2002. Allen and Michaely (2002) and 
Banyi  et  al.,  (2005)  evaluate  various  methods  for  estimating  actual  figures  of  stock 
repurchases and recommend a measure based on the cash flow statement that they name as 
Compustat purchases of common and preferred stock adjusted for the change in preferred 
stock, and which they consider as the most accurate (or least biased) measure of  the actual 
dollar  amount  spent  on  repurchases,  particularly  for  firms  with  high  stock  options.
10
  We 
follow this approach. Therefore, we identify stock repurchases as the amount of purchase of 
common and preferred stock (Compustat data item #115) minus any reduction in the value 
(retirement,  conversion,  and/or  redemption  of  preferred  stock,  Compustat  items  #56  and 
#130) of the net number of preferred stocks outstanding.
11
 
Our analysis of initial repurchases is conducted only on those firms listed on NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ that also conducted an IPO during the period of our investigation. We 
argue that using only initial repurchasers observations with their IPO date after 1975 as the 
basis for this study allows us a better understanding of the motives and timing for the initial 
repurchases decision. We classify actual repurchase programs as an “initial repurchase”, if 
this  is  the  first  repurchase  program  the  firm  has  had,  being  the  second  or  subsequent 
repurchase program classified as a “secondary repurchase”. All firms that didn’t purchase any 
of their stock until the final year under analysis are labeled as “non-repurchasers”. We begin 
by identifying firms on Compustat that repurchased their stock for the first time during the 
period 1980-2002 (henceforth, initial repurchase firms are “initial repurchasers”). An initial 
repurchase is defined as the first repurchase that a firm makes since its IPO. We will assume 
that the IPO year is the year that the firm had a positive stock price on Compustat (as Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002; Lemmon and Zender, 2003 and Bulan et al., 2006). We follow previous 
literature when we further restrict the sample to initial repurchases valued at more than one 
million US dollars. We follow previous literature in excluding those firms for which several 
relevant variables from our analysis were missing. Also, in line with previous studies, we 
truncate all variables at the top and bottom one percentiles. We further excluded financial 
companies and utilities (SIC codes 4813, 4900-4999 and 6000-6999) from our sample. These 
criteria  identify  our  sample  of  1,247  observations  of  initial  repurchases  collected  for  the 
                                                            
10 Also, Grullon-Michaely (2002) compared that measure to the amount of repurchase activity reported by SDC 
(amount of repurchases announced) and found that the correlation coefficient between these two measures is 0.97 
and that the dollar amounts were similar.  
11 The Compustat data item overstates open market repurchases of common stock for a number of reasons 
(Stephens-Weisbach, 1998; Jagannathan et al 2000). First, it includes repurchases of preferred stock. Second, it 
includes a variety of other transactions such as the conversion of other classes of stock into common stock. In  
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period 1980-2002 from the Compustat database. Then, we construct two contemporaneous 
control  samples  for  using  a  matched-sample  analysis.  The  first  sample  includes  only 
secondary  repurchasers  and  the  other  includes  non-repurchasers  (firms  who  have  never 
repurchased their stock since their IPO until the year in question).  
 
4. 2. Variables 
 
To study the determinants of initial stock repurchases, we will perform univariate and 
multivariate empirical analysis of the initial repurchases’ likelihood using a set of variables 
that the literature has identified as important in explaining any stock repurchase decision. 
These  variables  are  proxies  for  several  firm  characteristics  that  have  been  shown  to  be 
correlated with stock repurchases. Dittmar (2000), Grullon and Michaely, 2002), Jagannathan 
and Stephens (2003), among others, document that firms’ size, payout, industry, operating 
risk,  leverage,  cash  balances,  cash  flow,  growth  options,  earnings  and  sales  growth, 
profitability,  non-operating  income,  underpricing,  stock  returns,  total  retained  earnings, 
amount of stock options and ownership structure, all help explain the probability of a firm 
repurchasing  its  stock.  We  use  these  same  variables,  with  the  exception  of  ownership 
structure variables because the databases that includes those variables were unavailable to us. 
In the matched-pairs analysis approach, we control for size (which some literature considers 
as  a  proxy  for  asymmetric  information)  and  industry  (thus,  holding,  at  least  partially, 
operating risk and investment opportunities constant). In using the matched-pairs approach, 
we use three-year averages for all variables (unless otherwise noted) as in Jagannathan et al. 
(2000), either because it is possible that firms would initiate stock repurchases in response to 
cumulative performance, liquidity and risk from the previous years and also in order to reduce 
noise induced by year-to-year variations in many of the variables. That is, average values for 
years –3 through –1 relative to the initial repurchase year are used for variables prior to the 
initial  repurchase  year  and  average  values  for  years  0  through  +2  relative  to  the  initial 
repurchase  year  are  used  for  the  variables  subsequent to the repurchase initiation. In this 
context, the sample for our matched-pairs analysis is limited to the period from 1980 to 2002 
to allow for measurement of prior and subsequent variables. All variables’ absolute values are 
scaled by total assets (#6), unless otherwise stated, to control for scale effects and mitigate 
heteroskedasticity. Table 1A presents a synthesis of the definition and measure of all variables 
used and table 1B summarizes the last section’ hypothesis and expected relations between 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
some cases Compustat data item #115 corresponds to repurchases net of equity issuance, which Compustat 
indicates with a combined figure code. We treat such observations as missing values.  
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The main goal of this study is to identify the determinants that explain initial stock 
repurchases, by looking for economic characteristics of firms that influence that decision. We 
achieve this by using a cross-section of initial repurchase firms matched with two control 
samples (one that includes secondary repurchase firms and the other which includes non-
repurchase firms). In addition to univariate analysis, we perform cross section bivariate logit 
regressions.  
From our final sample of firms described before, we construct a matched sample of 
initial  repurchasers  with  secondary  repurchasers  and  non-repurchasers.  Each  initial 
repurchaser-year observation is paired with a secondary repurchaser-year observation and a 
non-repurchaser-year observation that is closest in terms of size (measured by total assets, 
within an interval of +/-25%) and within the same industry grouping (assuming the 4-digit 
SIC  code  as  primary  matching  and  2-digit  SIC  code  for  the  remaining  cases).  We  then 
estimate  several  logistic models using the two different matched-samples to associate the 
probability of an initial stock repurchase with the set of repurchase determinants mentioned 
before. In particular, we estimate logit models that relate each event-sample with its matched-
sample for all observations and for some sub-samples that were built by splitting each sample 
in some time periods, in market-to-book quartiles and according to the dividend-payers status 









The first step of our empirical analysis is designed to examine the differences between 
firms that repurchased their own stock for the first time and those firms similar in industry and 
size that either repurchased for the second time or more (secondary repurchases) or that didn’t  
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engage in any stock repurchase transactions before. Later, in future work we plan to analyze in 
depth the effect of operating risk and growth opportunities on the decision to initiate stock 
repurchases. 
Table 2 presents the sub-samples’ general information. First, table 2A shows that the 
final  sample  consists  of  2,016  industrial  companies  (i.e.,  excluding  utilities  and  financial 
firms) listed on the NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX. 630 initial repurchase firms were matched 
with 630 non-repurchase firms similar in size (differences lower than 25% of total assets) and 
industry  (four-to-two  digits  of  SIC  Codes)  out  of  782  possible  observations.  Also,  716 
secondary repurchase firms (taken from a total sample of 899 observations) were matched 
with the same number of initial repurchase firms.  
Table 2B shows the temporal distribution of initial repurchase firms (on the total final 
sample and on the two matched pairs samples). For this purpose, we split all observations in 
four 5-year periods (except the first group, which has 8 years, from 1980 to 1987, because it 
has a smaller number of observations).  
As expected, the number of initial repurchases always increased from the first period 
(between 6,2% and 8,4%) to the last period (between 48,6% and 53,2%) in such a way that the 
last period (1998-2002) includes almost half of the total observations of the three samples. 
The trend is fairly stable along the three samples. Therefore, our samples are dominated by 
firms that initiated stock repurchases after the nineties. This result is in line with all recent 
empirical  findings  about  stock  repurchases  (e.g.,  Fama  and  French,  2001;  Grullon  and 
Michaely, 2002). Also, this trend suggested to us the need to check whether there are any 
period-to-period  fundamental  differences  between  initial  repurchases  samples  and  their 
control matched pairs samples (see table 3H). 
Table 2C shows that firms that repurchase their stock for the first time do so on average 
5.5 to 5.6 years after the IPO (median of 4 years), without any noticeable differences across 
samples.  Finally,  although  not  included  in  the  tables,  we  document  that  83.5%  of  those 
transactions  occurred  before  10  years  following  the  IPO.  Also,  we  check  that  the  annual 
number  of  stock  repurchases  of  the  716 secondary  repurchase  firms  included  in  the  final 
sample was on average 5.3 times. 
Table 2D documents the mean and median age of all sample firms. As expected, the 
limit  in  IPO  year  of  our  initial  repurchase  firms  implies  that  those  firms  are  on  average 
younger than both non-repurchase and secondary repurchase firms. However, the initial and 
non-repurchase  firms  have  the  same  median  age,  which  is  important  when  considering 
potential life cycle effects.  
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Table  2E  shows  the  median  value  of  stock  repurchase  transactions  for  initial  stock 
repurchase firms (complete sample and two sub-samples) and secondary repurchase firms. We 
note  that  the  initial  repurchase  median  values  are  much  smaller  than  those  of  secondary 
repurchases, but this difference disappears ex-post in the subsequent 3 years. 
We begin our matched sample analysis by comparing some descriptive statistics of the 
explanatory variables across the three sub-samples (a sample of event firms relative to their 
matched two-sample control firms), reported in Tables 3A to 3L. These tables show that there 
are significant differences between the sample of initial repurchase firms and both control 
samples.  In  tables  3A,  3D  and  3H,  we  compare  ex-ante  descriptive  statistics.  In  order to 
reduce noise induced by year-to-year variations in many of the variables, these statistics are 
calculations based on three year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to     
-1). Tables 3B and 3E repeat the same analysis using ex-post values, meaning that calculations 
are based on three year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 0 to +2). 
These  time  windows  follow  the  work  of  Jagannathan et  al.,  (2000)  and  Jagannathan  and 
Stephens (2003). In tables 3C and 3F, we compare ex-post values with ex-ante values to 
preview  some  evolutionary  trends  with  economic  meaning.  In  table  G,  we  compare  the 
characteristics of the three sub-samples related to cash dividends and in table 3I we compute 
the correlation matrixes of variables for the two initial repurchase sub-samples. Finally, in 
tables J and L, we compare the ex-ante, ex-post and over time changes of medians (and some 
means) of our variables only to those firms that are included on both the event and control 
samples (of course, in different years). In fact, 56 firms are included on the initial repurchase 
sample and on the matched non-repurchase sample and 131 firms are included on the initial 
repurchase sample and on the matched secondary repurchase sample. With this, we check 
whether there are any specific results related to these firms. 
 
5.1.2. Results from Univariate Analysis 
 
5.1.2.1 Differences Between Initial Repurchase Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
 
First, in relation to non-repurchasers, initial repurchasers have higher dividend payout 
ratios (and dividend yields), operating cash flows, market-to-book ratios and profitability, 
both prior to and after the initial repurchase transaction (see tables 3A and 3B). Of those, only 
payout ratios and dividend yields differences are not statistically significant (in spite of the 
fact that the average value for initial repurchasers is 75.3% higher ex-ante and about 90% ex-
post). Initial repurchases are also made by firms with lower leverage and operating risk, on  
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average, before and after the initial repurchase event. There are no major differences in terms 
of  capital  and  other  discretionary  expenses, retained earnings (those variables have lower 
mean values but higher or similar median values), earnings per share and sales growth in 
relation to their non-repurchase peers.
12
  
Furthermore, initial repurchase firms present ex-ante higher cash balances, options and 
stock returns and ex-post higher non-operating income and retained earnings. Interestingly 
enough, in the initial repurchase year, 63% of the initial repurchase firms have higher stock 
returns  than  in  the  average  of  the  three  preceding  years  while  only  51%  of  their  non-
repurchasing counterparts present similar data. 
The ex-post versus ex-ante differences between the two control groups are quite similar 
(see table 3C). In particular, both samples present increases in leverage and decreases in cash 
flow,  market-to-book  ratios,  capital  and  other  discretionary  expenses,  sales  growth  and 
profitability.  In  addition,  we  notice  that  the  non-repurchase  firms’  median  values  remain 
lower than their initial repurchase counterparts but in almost all variables the net effects are 
such that they resemble a convergence trend. The only exceptions are leverage and operating 
risk. In both cases, the difference increases for non-repurchase firms. Finally, the stock returns 
for initial repurchase firms actually decreases, while the opposite occurs for non-repurchase 
firms.  
Overall,  these  results  seem  to  support  the  free  cash flow, the maturity and the risk 
reduction  signaling  theoretical  hypotheses  and  the  excess  cash  distribution  financial 
motivation  in  explaining  initial  stock  repurchases.  We  note,  however,  that  the  age  and 
retained earnings variables present evidence that contradicts the maturity hypothesis. This 
should be meaningful because these variables are present specifically to measure the impact 
of life cycle effects. Also, we find a slight support for the options hypothesis. Furthermore, 
initial repurchases seem to have similar financial characteristics to dividend increasers, as 
reported by Jagannathan et al., (2000) and Grullon and Michaely (2002), among others. The 
performance signaling hypothesis is mostly ruled out by the data (same result of Jagannathan 
and Stephens, 2003). Finally, the consistent higher values of market-to-book ratios of initial 
repurchase firms (and the similar values for previous stock returns) do not provide support for 
the  undervaluation-signaling  and  the  timing  theoretical  explanations  of  stock  repurchases. 
These  theories  are  only  slightly  present  in  the  data  since  there  is  a  significant  positive 
differential stock return of the initial repurchase year in relation to the three preceding years. 
 
                                                            
12 As expected, the matched-pairs analysis tends to neutralize the growth options impact on stock repurchases 
but the same is not achieved for the operating risk variable.  
- 30 - 
5.1.2.2 Differences Between Initial Repurchase Firms and Secondary Repurchase Firms 
 
When comparing the ex-ante and ex-post attributes of these two samples of firms (see 
tables 3D and 3E) the most basic differences are that our initial repurchase firms have higher 
cash balances, market-to-book ratios, profitability and sales growth and, on the other hand, 
secondary repurchase firms have larger payout ratios (and dividend yields), higher debt ratios, 
operating risk and retained earnings. All of these differences for ex-ante and ex-post values 
are statistically significant. There seem to be no significant differences of both samples in 
terms of options and non-operating income. Finally, ex-ante, initial repurchase firms present 
higher operating cash flows, earnings per share growth and stock returns and higher values ex-
post for capital and other discretionary expenses.  
Once again, the ex-post versus ex-ante differences between the two control groups are 
quite similar (see table 3F). In particular, only the significant trend of decreasing cash and 
stock returns, EPS growth and increasing retained earnings is specific to initial repurchase 
firms. Both samples present leverage and payout increases over time, and most other variables 
display decreasing trend in both samples. In other words, the relation between initial and 
secondary repurchase firms for all variables is stable, in spite of a small trend of convergence 
for most variables, with few exceptions (as is the case of payout ratios and dividend yields). 
This  similar  pattern  of  changes  in  both  samples  for  most  of  the  variables  is  not  easy  to 
explain.  For  instance,  the  trend  of  decreasing  cash,  cash  flow,  market-to-book  ratios, 
profitability,  earnings  per  share  and  sales  growth  and  stock  returns  and  the  higher  future 
growth, as a whole, is not consistent with the more frequent theoretical explanations for stock 
repurchases,  like  performance-signaling,  undervaluation-signaling  and  agency  costs 
considerations. Once again, the ex-post versus ex-ante differences between the two control 
groups are quite similar (see table 3F). In particular, only the significant trend of decreasing 
cash  and  stock  returns,  EPS  growth  and  increasing  retained  earnings  is  specific  to  initial 
repurchase firms. Both samples present leverage and payout increases over time, and most 
other variables display decreasing trend in both samples. In other words, the relation between 
initial and secondary repurchase firms for all variables is stable, in spite of a small trend of 
convergence  for  most  variables,  with  few  exceptions  (as  is  the  case  of  payout  ratios  and 
dividend yields). This similar pattern of changes in both samples for most of the variables is 
not easy to explain. For instance, the trend of decreasing cash, cash flow, market-to-book 
ratios,  profitability,  earnings  per  share  and  sales  growth  and  stock  returns  and  the  higher 
future growth, as a whole, is not consistent with the more frequent theoretical explanations for  
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stock  repurchases,  like  performance-signaling,  undervaluation-signaling  and  agency  costs 
considerations. 
In contrast, all facts cited above seem to suggest that maturity-based explanations are 
very useful in understanding the role of initial and secondary stock repurchases. Plausibly, the 
secondary  repurchase  firms  are  in  a  more  advanced  phase  of  their  life  cycle  than  initial 
repurchase firms: they are older, they distribute more cash flow to their stockholders and they 
have higher retained earnings (although they have the same operating risk). Also, these results 
seem to stress the importance of distributing excess cash as strong financial motivation for 
firms  to  initiate  stock  repurchases  much  stronger  than  to  those  firms  that  continue 
repurchasing stock over time.
13
 
Finally, these results show that secondary repurchase firms pay higher dividends than 
initial repurchase firms, which is not sufficient to conclude about the potential substitution of 
dividend increases with stock repurchases for both samples. This analysis will be provided 
later. 
 
5.1.2.3 Stock Returns Differences Between the Event and the Control Samples 
 
Stock returns are significantly positive for all samples. However, surprisingly, the initial 
repurchase firms have much larger median ex-ante stock returns than both control samples. 
The median stock returns for both initial repurchase samples are 18% and 16%, respectively 
and the two control samples present only 4% (for the non-repurchase firms group) and 10% 
return (for secondary repurchase firms group). These results were not anticipated because they 
simply  cast  doubt  about  the  undervaluation  and  market  timing  as  motives  for  initial  and 
secondary repurchases. Thus, they do not confirm the suspicions of Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998), Jagannathan et al., (2000), among others. The ex-post stock returns don’t present a 
clearer picture. First, the initial repurchasers’ median stock returns fall significantly in both 
sub-samples, but remain positive and higher than both their control samples. In these control 
samples, the stock returns increase (from 4% to 9% in the case of the non-repurchase group) 
or stabilize near the 10% return. These results don’t help us in explaining market performance 
but they confirm the findings of Ikenberry et al., (1995) who show that repurchasing firms 
outperform a matched sample over a four-year period following the repurchase announcement. 
Similar results occur in the event year. On average, more than 60% of the initial repurchase 
                                                            
13  Note  that  the  positive  correlation  between  operating  volatility  and  debt  ratios  for  all  sub-samples  is  a 
somewhat unexpected result. Bradley et al. (1984) and Kim and Sorensen (1986) report a negative relation 
between operating income volatility and debt levels. The opposite relation between operating risk and financial 
risk is clearly unsupported by our data.  
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firms have a higher stock return in the repurchase year in relation to the average stock returns 
in  the  three  years  prior  to  the  initial  repurchase  year.  Of  course,  we  did  not  use  market 
adjusted returns and the results for the two control samples show that in a particularly strong 
way, because they also present an above average performance. However, the difference is 
significant at 1% level in relation to the non-repurchase firms sample (63% against only 51%), 
and is positive, but not significantly, in relation to the secondary repurchase firms’ sub-sample 
(60% against 59%).  
Finally, the median values of market-to-book of firms that initiate stock repurchases also 
don’t seem consistent with the traditional view that firms repurchase stock when managers are 
most likely to perceive their stock as undervalued. That is the main motivation for repurchases 
by  infrequent  repurchase  firms,  as  documented  by  Jagannathan  and  Stephens  (2003).  In 
addition, if the stock repurchase activity is a mechanism of signaling undervaluation, this 
signal  does  not  appear  to  work  because  tables  3C  and  3F  show  that  following  an  initial 
repurchase transaction the market-to-book ratio actually decreases (as is also the case for both 
control samples). 
 
5.1.2.4 Operating Performance Differences Between the Event and the Control Samples 
 
The operating performance of both samples of initial repurchase firms is always higher 
than  their  control  samples.  This  result  applies  to  both  ex-ante  and  ex-post  data,  but  the 
differences in performance are larger for ex-ante median values. This is important because the 
operating performance of the two event samples decreases over time, while for the two control 
samples the data shows similar results ex-ante and ex-post. In other words, the data does not 
support the operating performance signaling argument, in which stock repurchases (initial and 
subsequent  repurchases)  signal  management’s  belief  that  the  firm’s  future  operating 
performance will improve.  However, these results are consistent with the findings of Grullon 
and  Michaely  (2002),  Jagannathan  and  Stephens  (2003),  among  others,  who  also  find  no 
evidence of operating earnings improvements following repurchase announcements. In face of 
this kind of results, Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) tried to address the possibility of the 
earnings  signaling  hypothesis  suggesting  “unexpected”  earnings  improvements  instead  of 
absolute  operating  performance.  They  examine  changes  in  analysts’  forecasts  around  the 
announcement of open-market stock repurchase and, again, they didn’t find any support for 
the signaling hypothesis. 
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5.1.2.5  Dividend  Characteristics  Differences  Between  the  Event  and  the  Control 
Samples 
 
Tables  3G  (panels  1,  2  and  3)  present  information  about  the  characteristics  of  the 
several sub-samples related to cash dividends. Up to here, tables 3C and 3F show that the 
dividend payout ratios for the secondary repurchasers are substantially larger than for the 
initial  repurchasers,  and  the  latter  firms  have  higher  payouts  than  their  non-repurchasers 
counterparts: the median values for payout ratios of the three sub-samples are 21%, 12% and 
7%, respectively. This monotonic trend (absent in all other variables) is magnified ex-post 
because the difference in median values increases even more after the initial repurchase event: 
24%, 13% and 7%, respectively. Both initial and secondary repurchases are, of course, used 
as an alternative mechanism of distributing cash flows to shareholders. The question is now to 
analyze  if  both  initial  and  secondary  stock  repurchases  are  used  to  substitute  for  cash 
dividends (as found by Grullon and Michaely, 2002) or as a complement of cash dividends (as 
documented by Fama and French, 2001). In terms of ex-ante non-operating cash flow values, 
there seem to be no differences between the four samples. Thus, there is no support for the 
dividends substitution hypothesis based on distribution of non-recurrent cash flows. Both the 
initial  and  secondary  repurchasers  are  in  many  ways  similar  to  dividend  paying  firms  as 
described by Jagannathan et al (2000). That is not true for the non-repurchasers sample, so 
both  types  of  firms  may  be  substituting  either  dividends  or  dividend  increases  by  stock 
repurchases as suggested by Grullon and Michaely (2000) or complementing them with stock 
repurchases (as suggested by Fama and French, 2001). 
Tables  3G  show  some  new  interesting  results.  For  instance,  almost  50%  of  the 
secondary repurchasers are dividend payers (against only 30% of initial repurchasers) with 
relatively high payouts (21%, against only 15% in the case of initial repurchase firms), as 
documented by Fama and French (2001), Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Jagannathan and 
Stephens (2003), and only a small minority of them in the two samples seem to be cutting 
dividends and (may be) replacing them with stock repurchases (as the proportion of the non-
dividend payers actually increases only in the samples of secondary repurchase firms). Panels 
1, 2 and 3 don’t present any substantial differences among the three different samples of 
initial  repurchasers  or  between  the  two  different  samples  of  no-repurchasers  and  the  two 
different samples of secondary repurchase firms. In addition, the proportion of non-dividend 
payers in the initial repurchasers samples is similar to the non repurchasers samples (about 
70%  of  observations),  and  is  much  larger  than  to  those  of  the  samples  of  secondary 
repurchasers (about 50% of observations), both ex-ante (panel 1) and ex-post (panel 2).   
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Furthermore, there are no significant differences between ex-post and ex-ante results for 
both initial repurchasers and non-repurchase firms. Interestingly, for secondary repurchase 
firms, there is an higher proportion of non-dividend payers in the ex-post samples than in the 
ex-ante  samples.  This  result  suggests  a  substitution  effect  between  dividends  and  stock 
repurchasers for some secondary repurchasers that stop distributing cash dividends, (maybe) 
replacing them with stock repurchases. This occurs in spite of a larger median ex-post payout 
ratio for secondary repurchasers (table 3F). This evidence is consistent with the findings of 
Fama and French (2001), that there is a lower number of firms paying dividends, although the 
average payout of these firms is increasing.  
Finally, panel 3 shows that more than half of the initial repurchasers and non-repurchase 
firms don’t change the average amount of cash dividends and that the number of dividend 
increases is significantly larger than the number of dividend decreases. The same trend occurs 
for the secondary repurchasers samples but the proportion of cases of firms that pay the same 
average  cash  dividends  is  much  lower  and  the  proportion  of  firms  that  both  increase  or 
decrease their cash dividends is higher. 
Overall, our results do not show strong evidence of dividends substitution by initial 
repurchases. 
 
5.1.2.6 Market-to-Book Ratios Differences Between the Event and the Control Samples 
 
So far, based on tables 3C and 3F, initial repurchase firms have market-to-book ratios 
that are significantly higher than both secondary and non-repurchase firms. These differences 
are robust because they remain for several years after the initial repurchase event suggesting 
that the initial repurchase firms are more likely to be overvalued. Ex-ante, the median values 
for the two initial repurchase firms samples are 2.50 and 2.30, respectively, while the non- 
repurchase  firms  sample  presents  a  median  market-to-book  ratio  of  only  2.05  and  the 
secondary repurchase firms exhibits only 1.84. Ex-post, there is a systematic downward trend 
for  all  cases,  but  the  rankings  remain  the  same:  the  median  values  for  the  two  initial 
repurchase firms samples drop to 2.14 and 2.13 respectively, while the non-repurchase firms 
market-to-book ratio falls to 1.89 and the secondary repurchase firms value decreases to only 
1.75. All these differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
These results are surprising and cast doubt on the undervaluation signaling hypothesis as 
the  main  explanation  for  initial  repurchases.  Jagannathan  and  Stephens  (2003)  argue  that 
infrequent  repurchase  announcements  (as  may  be  the  case  for  initial  repurchases)  are 
potentially used to signal management’s belief that the firm is currently under-valued. They  
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note, however, that this signal does not appear to work because these firms have lower ex-post 
market-to-book ratios, while the opposite change (a strong increase) occurs for the frequent 
repurchase firms. Although initial repurchases and infrequent repurchases are not the same 
kind of event and we are using stock repurchase actual values, instead of stock repurchase 
announcements, it is worth noting that our results are strikingly different from theirs. One may 
argue that market-to-book ratios are a poor proxy for undervaluation as they might measure 
the availability of growth options or the degree of asymmetric information. This is a strong 
argument, but the matched pairs analysis (and also the inclusion of other variables as proxies 
to  growth)  should  be  able  to  eliminate  those  industry  type  considerations,  with  only  the 
valuation  effects  remaining.  Further,  in  theory,  if  initial  repurchase  firms  should  have 
potentially high degrees of asymmetric information, then higher market-to-book ratios show 
that  they  are  more  likely  to  be  over than undervalued. However, the market performance 
analysis is not fully consistent with this idea. In fact, an average of 63.4% and 59.7% of initial 
repurchase  firms,  respectively  for  no-repurchase  firms  and  secondary  repurchase  firms’ 
samples, have higher stock returns in the event year than in the average of the following three 
years. This fact shows some undervaluation potential, although only the difference with the 
non-repurchase firms control sample is statistically significant. 
Therefore, we also want to check whether our striking results may primarily be driven 
by only a small sub-group of firms, according to the market-to-book ratio criteria. So, we split 
the two samples of initial repurchase firms in quartiles according to market-to-book ratios and 
we  performed  the  matched-pairs  analysis  with  the  other  two  control samples. Finally, we 
calculated the ex-ante medians or means for all variables in analysis to each group quartile. 
The resulting information is presented in tables 4A to 4E. We observe a strong uniformity in 
the  pattern  of  change  of  variables  like  size,  leverage,  cash,  cash  flow,  profitability,  non-
operating income, sales growth and dividend yield. For other variables, the pattern of change 
is just a little bit different, as is the case of growth and the two variables related to stock 
returns  (in  those  variables,  there  is  a  positive  relation  between  market-to-book  ratio  and 
growth  in  the  initial  repurchase firms samples, but this relation vanishes for both control 
samples). On the contrary, for variables such as payout, options, earnings per share growth 
and retained earnings, the pattern of change is totally dissimilar. For example, the relation 
between market-to-book ratio and payout ratio is an U-shaped type for one initial repurchase 
sub-sample, is negative for the other initial repurchase firms sub-sample, is also negative for 
the non-repurchase firms sample and is absent for the secondary repurchase firms sub-sample. 
As in the case of table H, it seems appropriate to perform the multivariate analysis by splitting 
all samples according to market-to-book ratio quartiles.  
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5.1.2.7 Behavior of the Event Samples in Four Different Time Periods 
 
The whole period of analysis is broken down into four time windows of five years 
(except  the  first  one  that  has  7  years  of  observations,  but  includes  only  about 8%  of  all 
matched-pairs  observations).  Therefore,  table  3H  aims  to  analyze  whether  there  are  any 
special time trends on the medians (and some means) of initial repurchase firms’ variables 
which could affect the relation between initial repurchases and their potential explanatory 
variables.  
In fact, the results are striking, because in almost all cases, the differences in means and 
medians are statistically significant (except operating risk, future growth, stock returns and 
EPS growth). Further, most of the variables either exhibit a monotonic decreasing behavior 
(payout,  leverage,  operating  cash  flows,  profitability,  retained  earnings,  and  non-operating 
income)  or  a  monotonic  increasing  behavior  (size  and  options).  The  main  exceptions  are 
market-to-book ratios, which present an irregular behavior, and cash and sales growth, that 
show an U-shaped relation. As size is not an important variable in the matched-pairs analysis, 
we checked the pattern of time evolution of the payout, leverage and operating cash flows 
variables for both control samples. We concluded that the three variables have a similar time 
evolution for all samples, although a little bit more irregular. That is, for some variables, the 
relation  between  initial  repurchase  firms  and  both  control  samples  seems  to  be  relatively 
stable  over  time.  However,  as  most  variables  show  significant  statistical  differences,  for 
robustness we conclude that it may be worthwhile to conduct a period-to-period multivariate 
analysis. 
 
5.1.2.8. Ex-Ante Correlation Matrixes for the Independent Variables  
 
Table 3I (panels 1 and 2) show the correlation coefficients of all explanatory variables 
for the two samples of initial repurchase firms prior to the event year. Two strong patterns 
appear in the data. First, the two correlation matrixes show an impressive stability, both in 
terms of sign and the magnitude of the coefficients. Second, these two tables do not indicate 
that any of the variables are too highly correlated with each other to cause a problem of 
multicolinearity. We also computed ex-ante correlation matrixes for both control samples but 
the results are, again, strikingly similar, therefore we don’t present them here.  
 
5.1.2.9. Univariate Analysis of Initial Repurchase Firms Included on Control Samples  
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In  tables  3J  and  3L  we  compare  the  financial  attributes  of  initial  repurchase  firms 
included in the two control sub-samples.  
We find a monotonic relation among initial, secondary and non-repurchase firms for 
only one variable, besides the expected relations for size and age, which is sales growth. In 
fact, initial repurchase firms are, of course, older and larger than non-repurchase firms and 
secondary repurchase firms are also older and larger than initial repurchase firms. In addition 
to this natural result, we find that secondary repurchase firms have lower sales growth than 
initial repurchase firms, which, in turn, also have lower sales growth than non-repurchase 
firms. We also find a striking similarity of ex-ante attributes between initial repurchase firms 
and both control samples, suggesting that there is much more similarity in these sub-samples 
than  in  the  samples  with  all  observations  included.  The  evidence  shows  that  the  only 
additional  difference  with  statistical  significance  is  the  lower  options  usage  for  initial 
repurchases  in  relation  to  non-repurchase  firms,  which  is  evidence  that  goes  against  the 
options  and  dilution  hypothesis.  Finally,  the  only  important  difference  between  initial 
repurchase firms and both control samples in ex-post attributes is the fact that secondary 
repurchase firms exhibit lower market-to-book ratios than initial repurchase firms. As we use 
this  variable  as  a  proxy  for  undervaluation,  this  may  suggest  that  the  timing  and 
undervaluation signaling hypotheses may be stronger explanations for initial rather than for 
secondary repurchase firms. 
 
 




Next,  we  estimate  logistic  regressions  to  investigate  the  determinants  of  the  initial 
repurchase decision in a multivariate context. The dependent variable equals one if the firm-
year observation is an initial repurchase, and is zero otherwise. We use the matched-pairs 
approach to explain the initial repurchase decision, whereby each initial repurchase firm-year 
observation is twinned with two time-industry-size matched firms, one of which is a non-
repurchase firm and the other a secondary repurchase firm. We use the same explanatory 
variables as those in the univariate analysis and, in addition, we use changes (ex-post minus 
ex-ante  values)  in  some  of  those  variables  in order to better test the operating signaling, 
timing, maturity and free cash flow theories.   
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The discussion of the results is based on table 1B, which presents predicted relations 
between independent variables and the likelihood of initial stock repurchases, and both tables 
5A  (for  initial  and  non-repurchases)  and  5B  (for  initial  and  secondary  repurchase  firms), 
which present the main results (coefficients and respective p-values) for all models used. The 
first model includes only the levels of explanatory variables and the second (extended) model 
also includes changes in some of those variables, as referred above. Tables 5A and 5B are 
divided in five panels. Panel 1 presents the two logit models for all observations and panel 2 
shows the same models separately for those firms that paid dividends in the three previous 
years (dividend payers) and those firms that did not (non-dividend payers). Finally, panels 3, 4 
and 5 present the extended models by splitting observations in four market-to-book and size 
quartiles  and  four  time  periods.  The  main  implication  of  most  empirical  studies  is  that 
market-to-book ratios and size may affect initial stock repurchase policy. To test for this 
relation between stock repurchases and market-to-book ratios, we divide the initial repurchase 
firms into four market-to-book quartiles. Also, to ensure that our results are not driven by a 
particular time trend, we perform similar tests for the four sub-periods: 1980-1987, 1988-
1992, 1993-1997 and 1998-2002.  
For convenience of analysis and reading, we present our multivariate results grouped by 
theoretical hypothesis. Therefore, as each section is directly related with all tables 5A and 5B. 




5.2.2. Performance Signaling Hypothesis 
 
For the matched samples of initial and non-repurchase firms, we find little support for 
the signaling role of operating performance variables. If operating performance would have 
some effect on initial stock repurchase likelihood, we should expect operating performance 
improvements for initial repurchasing firms relative to non-repurchase firms. We find that 
firms with higher current sales growth and decreases in market-to-book ratios and operating 
risk, and, also, lower operating risk and future growth opportunities are significantly more 
likely to be involved in initial repurchases. Therefore, the coefficients of changes in operating 
cash  flows  and  profitability  are  not  statistically  significant,  which  enable  us  to  reject  the 
operating profitability improvements hypothesis. Our results are in line with some empirical 
literature on stock repurchases (e.g., Bernatzi et al., 1997; Lie and McConnell, 1998; Grullon 
and Michaely, 2002 and 2004), although results on this are not consensual (e.g., Bartov, 1991;  
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Jagannathan et al., 2000 find different results). We note, however, that most of the supportive 
data comes from the 1998-2002 period, in which we find increases in operating cash flows 
and market-to-book ratios and higher sales growth. 
Finally, our results are fully consistent with the risk reduction signaling hypothesis, 
which is also a confirmed result in the literature (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Lie, 2005) 
but, again, not consensual (e.g., Jagannathan et al., 2000). This result is mostly driven by the 
1998-2002 period of observations.
14  
In the context of the performance signaling hypothesis, the matched-control analysis 
with initial and secondary repurchase firms is mostly exploratory. Therefore, any significant 
differences between the two groups may contribute to the unique role of initial repurchase 
relative to secondary repurchase firms. In fact, we find that initial repurchasing firms have 
higher sales growth, lower operating risk and present higher increases in profit relative to 
secondary repurchase firms, which suggests that the likelihood of using stock repurchases as a 
signal of future operating performance improvements is slightly stronger for initial repurchase 
firms (in particular for the dividend payers and firms within the upper quartile of market-to-
book  ratio  and  lower  quartile  of  size).  All  other  coefficients  that  relate  to  operating 
performance  are,  however,  insignificant.  Finally,  risk  reduction  signaling  is  somewhat 
supported as a stronger theoretical explanatory hypothesis for initial repurchase rather than for 
secondary repurchase firms.  
 
5.2.3. Undervaluation Signaling Hypothesis 
 
Our evidence on UNDERP, CHUNDERP, STOCKRET and CHSTOCKRET variables 
in  the  two  matched-pairs  samples  shows  that  initial  repurchases  are  neither  preceded  by 
significantly  lower  stock  returns,  nor  followed  by  significant  market  performance 
improvements.  In  relation  to  secondary  repurchase  firms,  evidence  shows  that  initial 
repurchase firms have higher ex-ante returns (although this decreases significantly with the 
inclusion of CHSTOCKRET), which suggests a lower undervaluation signaling role of initial 
repurchases  relative  to  the  other  repurchase  transactions. However, for all other variables 
related to undervaluation signaling, we do not find any significant differences between initial 
repurchase and secondary repurchase firms. Thus, if the stock repurchase decision aims to 
send a signal of undervaluation to the stock market, it clearly fails to do so (confirming Kahle, 
2002 for all stock repurchases).  
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There  are  three  exceptions,  however.  The  first  exception  comes  from  the  fact  that, 
relative  to  non-repurchase  firms,  both  initial  and  secondary  repurchase  firms  present 
significantly higher stock returns in the initial repurchase year relative to the average of the 
three previous years. The next exception comes from the sub-sample of non-dividend payers 
in the initial and non-repurchases analysis, where results show a negative relation between 
underpricing and initial repurchase likelihood, suggesting that initial repurchases for these 
firms  may  have  a  role  in  transmitting  undervaluation  information  to  financial  markets. 
Finally, as expected, the results are not robust across all time periods. For example, as several 
studies  document  a  decreasing  trend  in  the  average  (abnormal)  returns  related  to  stock 
repurchases (Lie, 2000; Jagannathan et al., 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Kahle, 2002), 
we should expect a different impact of the undervaluation signal role of initial and secondary 
repurchases over time. We report positive changes in market-to-book ratios for secondary 
repurchases  in  the  period  of  1982-1987  and  some  contradictory  evidence  in  some  other 
periods.  These  three  pieces  of  evidence,  however,  do  not  contradict  the  fact  that  initial 
repurchase firms do not have a recent history of relative low stock returns. Therefore, we posit 
that, overall, there is no consistent evidence in support of undervaluation signaling hypothesis 
in our data.  
 
5.2.4. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
 
The crucial predictions of the free cash flow hypothesis are related with the availability 
of cash flow and lower growth opportunities. In this context, the stock repurchase decision is 
important to reduce equity agency costs, in particular to firms with lower debt ratios and/or 
higher  cash  balances.  In  fact,  our  evidence  on  initial  and  non-repurchase  firms’  samples 
confirms most of these predictions. In other words, our findings support the hypothesis that 
firms repurchase their stock for the first time in response to potential free cash flow problems, 
as almost all variables have statistical significance with the proper signs, with the exception 
of cash balances. Similar results for stock repurchase firms have been found in the literature 
(e.g., Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Kahle, 2002; Allen and Michaely, 2002). We note that the 
leverage  motivation  does  not  seem  to  be  important  because  the  change  in  the  leverage 
variable shows that ex-post initial repurchase firms remain under-leveraged relative to non-
repurchase firms (specially, larger and lower market-to-book initial repurchase firms). In fact, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
14 In spite of the matching approach, we may also conclude that initial repurchase firms have a lower degree of 
asymmetric  information  relative  to  non-repurchase  firms  in  view  of  the  strong  significance  of  the  negative 
relation between growth and initial repurchase likelihood.  
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the sign of change in leverage is significantly negative for all observations and for the sub-
samples of the two lower quartiles of market-to-book ratios and for the higher size quartile. 
Evidence  in  initial  and  secondary  repurchase  firms’  samples  also  shows  that  initial 
repurchase firms have significantly lower debt ratios but there are no significant differences in 
cash, cash flow and future growth variables. Initial repurchase firms present, however, higher 
current and future growth in sales, which goes against the free cash flow hypothesis. We 
consider those findings as evidence that, like initial repurchases, secondary repurchases are 
also transactions that aim to distribute excess cash flows to alleviate potential equity agency 
problems, in spite of the fact that secondary repurchase firms have higher debt ratios and 
similar cash balances.  
 
5.2.5. Dividends Substitution Hypothesis 
 
In  testing  the  dividends  substitution  hypothesis  for  the  samples  of  initial  and  non 
repurchase firms, we find that the coefficient related to non-operating income is statistically 
significant, which is driven by the sub-sample of non-dividend payers. In our interpretation, 
this  finding  means  that the motivation for distributing transitory cash flows increases the 
likelihood of initial repurchases, especially for non-dividend payers (and lower market-to-
book  firms),  which  confirms  the  results  of Guay and Harford (2000), Jagannathan et al., 
(2000) and Fenn and Liang (2001) for stock repurchase firms. It also indicates that transitory 
cash  flows  are  more  relevant  for  non-dividend  payers,  meaning  that  the argument  of  the 
different economic roles of the two payout instruments is only valid when there is no prior 
cash  dividends  distribution.15  For  dividend  payers,  we  find  that  the  change  in  payouts  is 
significantly negative for the larger size quartile, which may suggest that only larger firms 
substitute dividends by stock repurchases. In addition, for non-dividend payers, it seems that 
initial  repurchases  may  substitute  potential  dividend  payments  as  an  instrument  for 
distribution of surplus operating cash flows in contexts of decreasing operating volatility and 
growth opportunities. In fact, the probability of repurchasing stock for the first time increases 
with higher operating cash flows and lower growth and operating risk (this last result is not 
valid for dividend payers). This evidence is consistent neither with Grullon and Michaely 
(2002), who find stock repurchase firms have higher operating volatility, nor with Fama and 
French (2001), who find that stock repurchase firms present higher growth. In our view, these 
                                                            
15 We note that for the period of 1982-87, the negative sign in the change payout variable is consistent with the 
negative sign of change in the profit variable. We suspect that these oldest initial repurchase transactions may 
have been conducted by firms willing to substitute dividends by stock repurchases in view of expected decreases 
in operating profitability.  
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findings are more in line with Dittmar and Dittmar (2002), which argue that stock repurchases 
are a way of distributing both transitory and permanent cash flows, while cash dividends are a 
way of distributing permanent cash flows. Thus, stock repurchases and dividends are both 
substitutes and complements. Finally, the argument of non-substitution held by Fama and 
French (2001) and DeAngelo et al., (2002) that stock repurchases are made by younger firms 
seems to be valid also for initial with repurchases, whether they pay dividends or not. 
For  the  samples  of  initial  and  secondary  repurchase  firms  some  results  are  worth 
mentioning.  First,  as  expected,  we  find  opposite  results  from  the  analysis  of  the  non-
repurchase firms matched sample in relation to the availability of non-operating cash flows. 
These  transitory  cash  flows  actually  decrease  the  likelihood  of  initial  repurchases,  which 
means that their distribution is a stronger motivation for secondary repurchases rather than for 
initial repurchases. However, we should note that these results are driven only by the sub-
sample of dividend payers. This may be considered as evidence of the complementary role of 
dividends and secondary repurchases in distributing excess cash flows: dividend payments to 
distribute  operating  cash  flows  and  (secondary)  repurchases  to  distribute  non-operating 
income (e.g., Jagannathan et al., 2000; Guay and Harford, 2000, among others).  
Overall,  we  find  evidence  that  firms  systematically  use  initial  and  secondary  stock 
repurchases to distribute non-operating cash flows in order to take advantage of the flexibility 
of stock repurchases. The other evidence neither supports nor rejects the predictions about the 
dividends  substitution  hypothesis,  mainly  because  the  assumptions  of  higher  growth  and 
operating risk of initial repurchase firms are rejected by our data. In fact, as documented by 
the univariate analysis, some firms may replace dividends by stock repurchases, while others 
may repurchase their stock without decreasing dividend payouts.  
 
5.2.6. Differential Tax Rates Hypothesis 
 
One of the most significant findings of our analysis is the lower debt ratios of initial 
repurchase  firms  in  relation  to  both  samples  of  non-and-secondary  repurchase  firms. 
Therefore, it is plausible that firms may use initial repurchase to increase leverage. Indeed, 
one  possible  explanation  for  this  policy  is  related  to  tax  considerations,  but  we  can  not 
exclude the effect of alternative explanations in driving this result, as is the case of mitigating 
free  cash  flow  agency  costs.  Of  course,  we  may  argue  that,  if  interest  tax  shields  is  an 
important explanatory variable we shouldn’t expect any differences between the samples of 
initial and secondary repurchase firms, but they actually exist.  
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We  can,  however,  easily  reject  both  the  leverage  and  payout  tax  effects  as  strong 
explanations  of  initial  repurchases.  Firstly,  the  change  in  payout  coefficients  are  only 
significantly negative for the larger size sub-sample and for the 1982-87 time period, which 
may indicate that tax reasons were important to explain initial repurchases in this period but 
not in later periods. Second, none of the coefficients of changes in the leverage variable have 
significant  positive  signs.  Finally,  as  expected,  we  find  no  statistical  significance  for  the 
change in payout variables in the initial and secondary repurchase firms analysis, with the 
exception  of  the  opposite  sign  for  dividend  payers,  because  the  tax  effect  shouldn’t  be 
stronger for any of these two samples of repurchase firms. Overall, our results are similar to 
those of recent empirical literature on stock repurchases, such as Jagannathan et al., (2000) 
and  Dittmar  (2000),  which  conclude  that  differential  tax  rates  are,  at  maximum,  weak 
determinants of the stock repurchase behavior of firms. 
 
5.2.7. Maturity Hypothesis 
 
Our results show mixed evidence for the initial and non-repurchase firms analysis in 
support of the maturity hypothesis. On one hand, our logistic regressions support the maturity 
hypothesis  by  documenting  significant  positive  coefficients  on  cash  flow  and  negative 
coefficients on growth and operating risk. Those results are shared with the literature on stock 
repurchases (Jagannathan et al, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002, etc). On the other hand, 
the coefficients of changes in those variables are mostly non significant, with the exception of 
negative changes in operating risk. Furthermore, we find that the cash and retained earnings 
variables  are  also  not  significant  for  most  regressions  (and  have  contradictory  significant 
signs  in  some  regressions).  Finally,  some  variables  present  evidence  against  maturity 
hypothesis, such as lower cash balances (only for model 1), higher current sales growth (with 
the exception of dividend payers) and lower age (robust result for all sub-samples).  
These latter results, in particular the non significance of retained earnings and the fact 
that  initial  repurchase  firms  are  significantly  younger  firms,  cast  doubt  on  the  maturity 
hypothesis (and confirm the results of Fama and French, 2001; Grullon and Michaely, 2002).  
The results of initial and secondary repurchase firms samples also show mixed evidence 
in  support  of  our  prediction:  the  maturity  hypothesis  of  secondary  (in  relation  to  initial) 
repurchase firms. We document that initial repurchase firms present higher current and future 
growth in sales and the age variable is persistently significantly negative for all sub-samples. 
However,  we  find  also  contradictory  evidence,  coming  from  the  significance  of  negative 
changes  in  operating  cash  flows  and  lower  operating  risk  and,  in  particular,  the  non  
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significance of retained earnings (since we expected a negative relation between this variable 
and  the  initial  repurchase  likelihood,  relative,  of  course,  to  secondary  repurchase 
counterparts). 
To  summarize,  the  results  do  not  allow  us  to either promptly confirm or reject the 
maturity hypothesis as an explanation for initial and secondary repurchasing activity. 
 
5.2.8. Timing Hypothesis 
 
The results clearly show that both initial and secondary repurchase firms either do not 
attempt or do not succeed in timing the market. Surprisingly, we find strong evidence of this 
rejection because, with the exception of the negative relation with leverage (in fact, one of the 
weakest predictions of the timing hypothesis), all other predictions are not verified (as in 
Grullon and Michaely, 2002 and Dittmar and Dittmar, 2007). In particular, the stock returns 
history  and  changes  in  underpricing  and  stock  returns  are  either  insignificant  or  have 
contradictory signs. In view of the strong importance of these two variables to test the market 
timing hypothesis, we consider that our results allow us to reject this explanatory hypothesis. 
We  note,  however,  that  the  results  of  the  initial  and  secondary  repurchase  firms  analysis 
suggest that the rejection of the timing hypothesis is valid for all repurchase firms. Most 
empirical  evidence  goes  against  this  result  (e.g.,  Stephens  and  Weisbach,  1998;  Dittmar, 
2000; Jagannathan et al., 2000; Fama and French, 2001), although Kahle (2002) and Grullon 
and Michaely (2002) confirm some of our results when they report that stock repurchase firms 
have higher ex-ante market-to-book ratios. Dittmar and Dittmar (2007) present a possible 
explanation, documenting that the pro-cyclical nature of aggregate stock repurchase activity is 
influenced by actual changes in the business cycle and not by market timing decisions. 
 
 5.2.9. Options and Dilution Hypothesis 
 
Our evidence does not support the options and dilution hypothesis for both initial and 
secondary repurchase firms. All variables are either insignificant or have opposite signs from 
the ones predicted by this hypothesis. Again, there is little similar prior evidence for this 
result (except Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003; Banyi et al., 2005). The only result worth 
mentioning is the fact that initial repurchase firms that pay dividends have significantly lower 
options than their two matched sample counterparts.  
 
5.2.10 Multivariate Analysis Conclusions  
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The analysis in this section yields several interesting results, not only regarding initial 
repurchases but also for stock repurchases in general. 
Firstly,  consistent  with  the  findings  of  Nohel  and  Tarhan  (1998),  Jagannathan  and 
Stephens  (2003),  Lie  (2005),  among  others,  the  free  cash  flow  theory  and  risk  reduction 
signaling are the only two fully confirmed theoretical hypotheses to initial repurchase firms. 
We also find strong support for the flexibility motivation in distributing non-operating cash 
flows.  While  this  conclusion  is  also true for secondary repurchase firms, we document a 
somewhat weaker support of the two theoretical hypotheses for these firms and a stronger 
support for the flexibility motivation for using stock repurchases.  
Secondly,  there  is  no  consistent  evidence  about  the  role  of  initial  repurchases  as  a 
financial instrument used to signal operating performance improvements but the evidence 
suggests that the likelihood of this using stock repurchases as a signal device for that matter is 
slightly higher for initial repurchase than for secondary repurchase firms.  
Thirdly, we find mixed evidence for the maturity and dividend substitution hypotheses. 
In addition to the strong support for the flexibility motivation, the comparison between initial 
and non repurchase firms on these two hypotheses is largely inconclusive, although some 
results indicate that secondary repurchase firms have some stronger maturity attributes than 
initial  repurchase  firms.  In  addition,  although  the  matched-pairs  criteria  may  be  an 
explanation for this, initial repurchase firms are clearly younger firms than both matched 
samples. 
Fourthly, the significant lower leverage of initial repurchase firms relative to non and 
secondary repurchase firms, both ex-ante and ex-post, is an interesting result, which may be 
related to the existence of free cash flow problems (already confirmed), other equity agency 
costs and tax reasons. We show that this latter explanation is not confirmed by our data. 
Another possible interpretation of this result is that these firms want to manage their capital 
structure when debt ratios fall below a potential target ratio (Dittmar, 2000). This motivation 
may  be  rejected  because  change  in  leverage  remains  negative  and  significant  for  initial 
repurchase firms and insignificant for secondary repurchase firms. An alternative explanation 
is that concerns over the increased risk of financial problems prevents highly leveraged firms 
from repurchasing stock for the first time and only the others can do so. Again, this is not 
confirmed as secondary repurchase firms present higher debt ratios than initial repurchase 
firms.  
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Fifthly,  there  is  clear  evidence  contrary  to  some  theoretical  explanations  of  stock 
repurchases,  such  as  undervaluation  signaling,  timing,  payout  tax  effects and options and 
dilution hypotheses. 
In  addition,  we  find  some  differences  over  time,  across  market-to-book  and  size 
quartiles and for two classes of dividend payers. The most persistent differences between the 
results from groups of non-dividend and dividend payers are associated with the stronger 
empirical support for the flexibility motivation for non-dividend payers. Also, higher values 
for the options variable clearly decrease the likelihood of initial repurchases for dividend 
payers only. Very few variables are statistically significant with the same signs for all market-
to-book and size quartiles and for the four time periods. However, we do not find situations in 
which the results of theoretical explanations referred to in these sections would be changed.  
Finally,  the  intercepts  should  be  interpreted  as  the  average  likelihood  for  initial 
repurchases after all independent variables are considered. They are almost always positive 
and not significant, suggesting that the models considered are complete in terms of average 
effects on the initial repurchase likelihood (and that after all those independent variables are 
considered, firms are, not significantly, more likely to be initial repurchase firms than both 
non  and  secondary  repurchase  firms).  Also,  the  significance  test  of  log  likelihood  of  all 
models allows us to conclude that there is a significant relationship between the dependent 
variable and the set of independent variables. In relation to the McFadden R-squared measure, 
we would characterize the relationships as strong. Of course, not all variables are significant 





In this paper, we investigate the determinants of initial stock repurchase transactions by 
studying the validity of the motivations and theoretical explanations commonly mentioned in 
the literature to explain stock repurchases. First, we find that initial repurchase firms have 
some specific financial attributes in relation to both non-repurchase and secondary repurchase 
(size and industry) matched peers. In particular, compared to matched non-repurchase firms, 
initial  repurchase  firms  are  younger,  have  lower  leverage  and  operating  risk,  and  higher 
payouts, operating cash flows, profitability and market-to-book. Vis-a-vis matched secondary 
repurchase  firms,  initial  repurchase  firms  are  also  younger  (of  course),  have  higher  cash, 
profitability,  sales  growth  and  market-to-book  and  lower  payouts,  leverage  and  retained 
earnings.  We  perform  several  univariate  and  multivariate  analyses  to  conclude  that  the  
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theoretical hypotheses found in the financial literature that are most important in explaining 
initial stock repurchases are the free cash flow and risk reduction signaling hypotheses and the 
flexibility motivation in distributing cash flows. We do not find strong support for any other 
theoretical  explanations  of  stock  repurchases,  such  as  undervaluation  signaling,  timing, 
maturity, tax effects and options and dilution hypotheses and leverage increasing and excess 
cash  distribution  motivations.  These  results  confirm  some  previous  evidence  about  stock 
repurchases in general but also contradict other empirical results, even in the same studies. 
(e.g., Dittmar, 2000; Jagannathan et al., 2000; Kahle, 2002). However our results are more in 
line with works such as those of Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Grullon and Michaely (2002; 2004) 
and Lie (2005), as they also support the free cash flow and risk reduction signaling hypotheses 
and the flexibility motivation for stock repurchases.  
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Table 1A: Definition and Measurement of Variables 
List of variables used with definition and Compustat code. Data for firms’ characteristics are obtained 
from the Compustat database (see appendix 1 for more details). 
Variables  Definition  Compustat # 
SIZE  Natural log of the book value of assets  ln(#6) 
PAYOUT  Dividend payout ratio  #21/#18 
LEVERAGE  Book value of total debt  (#9+#44)/#6 
CASH  Cash balances   #1/(#6-#1) 
CASHFLOW  Operating cash flow  (#110+#308)/#6 
UNDERP  Equity market-to-book ratio  (#24*#25)/#60 
GROWTH  Capex advertising and R&D  (#128+#45+#46)/#6 
PROFIT  Return on assets  #18/#6 
OPRISK  Operating risk  Stdev(#18/#6) 
OPTIONS  Stock reserved for stock options  #215/#6 
NONOPINC  Non operating income  #61/#6 
EPSGRW  Earnings per share growth  #58(t/t-1)-1 
SALESGRW  Sales growth  #12(t/t-1)-1 
RETEARN  Total retained earnings  #36/#6 
DIVYIELD  Dividend yield  #21/(#24*#25) 
STOCKRET  Stock return  (#24*#25)(t/t-1)-1 
STOCKRET1  Stock return of initial repurchasers  Dummy variable 
AGE  Years since first stock market price  - 















R0  R2  R0  R2  R0  R2  R0  R2  R0  R2  R0  R2  R0  R2  R0  R2 
SIZE                                 
PAYOUT              ?  ?   ∆–  =             
LEVERAGE          + =  +      –; ∆+  =      – ; ∆+  =     
CASH          – = ; 
∆+ = 
– ; ∆+          – =  –         
CASHFLOW  ∆+  ∆+      – = ; 
∆+ = 
– ; ∆+  ?  –      – = ; 
∆+ = 
– ; ∆+         
UNDERP  – ; ∆+  – ; ∆+  – ; ∆+  – ; ∆+                  – ; ∆+  =     
GROWTH  +  +      + = ; 
∆+ = 




       
PROFIT  ∆+  ∆+                             








    +  + 
OPTIONS                              +  = 
NONOPINC              +  –                 
EPSGRW                              +  + 
SALESGRW  +  +      + = ; 
∆+ = 




       
RETEARN                      – =  –         
DIVYIELD              ?  ?   –  =             
STOCKRET      – ; ∆+  – ; ∆+                  – ; ∆+  =     
STOCKRET1      +; ∆+  +; ∆+                         
AGE              ?  –      – =  –         
Signs: Positive relation (+); Negative relation (–); no positive relation (– =); no negative relation (+ =); Ex-post increase (∆+); Ex-post decrease (∆–). 
R0: sample of non-repurchase firms; R2: sample of secondary-repurchase firms.  
Note: Predicted relations take into consideration the hypothesis development in section 3.1. and have signs consistent with the differential strength expected for initial repurchase 
firms and their matched counterparts. Therefore, they may include different signs from conventionally predicted relations in order to account for the overall research question related 
to the uniqueness of initial repurchases. For example, the prediction for the free cash flow theory and maturity hypothesis is that they may apply to secondary repurchases but not to 
initial repurchases. Thus the predicted signs of the comparison with the non-repurchase firms are the opposite from the conventional application of this theory.  
Table 2A: Frequency Distribution of Observations (1980-2002) 
Final samples consist of 2,016 industrial companies (i.e., excluding utilities and financial firms) listed 
on the NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX. The initial repurchase firms are those firms that went public 
between 1975 and 2002 and which repurchased their stock for the first time between 1980 and 2002 
(zero observations for 1980 and 1981). Non-repurchase firms are contemporaneous size-and industry-
matched firms that never repurchase their stock and secondary repurchase firms are contemporaneous 
size-and industry-matched firms that have repurchased their stock more than once. 
Type of Observation  Number of Observations  Number of Matched Pairs 
Non-Repurchases (R0)  782  630 
Initial Repurchases (R1)  1,247  630 (R0) - 716 (R2) 
Secondary Repurchases (R2)  899  716 
 
Table 2B: Temporal Distribution of Initial Repurchases (1980-2002) 
Time Range  Number of Observations  Number of Matched Pairs 
R0 – R2 
1980-1987  77 (6,2%)  53 (8,4%) – 55 (7,7%) 
1988-1992  142 (11,4%)  77 (12,2%) – 98 (13,7%) 
1993-1997  364 (29,2%)  194 (30,8%) – 214 (29,9%) 
1998-2002  664 (53,2%)  306 (48,6%) – 349 (48,7%) 
Total  1,247 (100%)  630 (100%) – 716 (100%) 
 
Table 2C: Length of Time Between IPO and Initial Repurchases (in years) 
Matched Pairs Analysis  Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
R1 – R0 (630 R1)  5.6  4.0  4.4 
R1 – R2 (716 R1)  5.5  4.0  4.3 
Total R1 observations (1,247 R1)  5.5  4.0  4.3 
 
Table 2D: Age of Sample Firms (in years) 
Matched Pairs Analysis  Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
Initial Repurchase Firms  5.5  4.0  4.3 
Non-Repurchase Firms  7.1  4.0  8.3 
Secondary Repurchase Firms  16.9  13.0  13.4 
 
Table 2E: Median Repurchase Values (in USD millions) 







Initial Repurchases (R1)  1,247  6.0  15.0 
Initial Repurchases (R1) sub-sample  630  5.0  12.2 
Initial Repurchases (R1) sub-sample  716  6.2  15.9 
Secondary Repurchases (R2)  716  10.5  13.4 
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Table 3A: Ex-Ante Descriptive Statistics for Event Firms and No Repurchases Control Firms  
Summary descriptive statistics for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchases matched-pairs control firms (R0). 
Ex-ante means that calculations are based on three-year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 
to -1). A t-test on differences in means is performed for PAYOUT, OPTIONS, DIVYIELD and the dummy 
variable STOCKRET1. A non-parametric Mann/Whitney ranksum test on differences in medians between these 
two sub-samples of firms is conducted for all other variables. The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** 
indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions 
and text for details. 
Variables  Event Firms (R1) 
 
Non-Repurchase Firms (R0)  Difference 
in Medians  
  Mean  St. Dev.  Median  Mean  St. Dev.  Median  or Means 
SIZE  5.230  1.184  4.941  5.150  1.258  4.944   
PAYOUT  0.121  0.648  0.000  0.069  1.387  0.000   
LEVERAGE  0.172  0.179  0.124  0.222  0.238  0.148  *** 
CASH  0.417  0.677  0.167  0.482  1.174  0.124  * 
CASH FLOW  0.097  0.102  0.100  0.054  0.158  0.071  *** 
UNDERP  3.502  4.421  2.498  3.413  6.268  2.054  *** 
GROWTH  0.133  0.096  0.115  0.154  0.146  0.120   
PROFIT  0.052  0.137  0.064  0.000  0.222  0.040  *** 
OPRISK  0.066  0.108  0.035  0.101  0.220  0.039  ** 
OPTIONS  0.042  0.069  0.007  0.041  0.077  0.000  *** 
NONOPINC  0.012  0.028  0.009  0.011  0.019  0.008   
EPSGRW  -0.125  7.426  0.010  0.183  9.160  0.023   
SALESGRW  0.663  7.338  0.251  0.964  3.787  0.264   
RETEARN  0.317  2.348  0.338  0.831  1.536  0.292   
DIVYIELD  0.008  0.041  0.000  0.006  0.021  0.000   
STOCKRET  0.681  4.284  0.182  0.426  1.470  0.043  *** 
STOCKRET1  0.634  0.482  1.000  0.512  0.500  1.000  *** 
 
 
Table 3B: Ex-Post Descriptive Statistics for Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Control Firms 
Summary descriptive statistics for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0). Ex-
post means that calculations are based on three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 0 
to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for PAYOUT, OPTIONS, DIVYIELD and the dummy 
variable STOCKRET1. A non-parametric Mann/Whitney ranksum test on differences in medians between these 
two sub-samples of firms is conducted for all other variables. The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** 
indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions 
and text for details. 
Variables  Event Firms (R1) 
 
Non-Repurchase Firms (R0)  Difference 
in Medians 
  Mean  St. Dev.  Median  Mean  St. Dev.  Median  or Means 
SIZE  5.866  1.057  5.617  5.830  1.080  5.622   
PAYOUT  0.127  0.672  0.000  0.067  1.420  0.000   
LEVERAGE  0.181  0.172  0.144  0.248  0.270  0.177  *** 
CASH  0.330  0.522  0.121  0.380  0.938  0.106   
CASH FLOW  0.096  0.074  0.092  0.061  0.148  0.070  *** 
UNDERP  2.749  2.358  2.137  2.750  3.639  1.890  *** 
GROWTH  0.122  0.086  0.108  0.129  0.109  0.102   
PROFIT  0.033  0.109  0.047  -0.034  0.269  0.028  *** 
OPRISK  0.066  0.113  0.035  0.122  0.284  0.046  *** 
OPTIONS  0.022  0.044  0.000  0.021  0.051  0.000   
NONOPINC  0.011  0.015  0.008  0.008  0.033  0.006  *** 
EPSGRW  -0.231  1.273  -0.007  -1.034  12.89  0.000   
SALESGRW  0.137  0.841  0.080  0.123  0.312  0.075   
RETEARN  0.449  5.351  0.397  0.552  2.390  0.303  *** 
DIVYIELD  0.006  0.020  0.000  0.008  0.030  0.000   
STOCKRET  0.203  0.561  0.101  0.240  0.738  0.091   
STOCKRET1  0.630  0.483  1.000  0.588  0.493  1.000   
  
- 59 - 
 
Table 3C: Ex-Post Versus Ex-Ante Medians for Event Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms 
In this table, we calculate medians for event firms (R1) and for non-repurchase matched-pairs control firms (R0) 
for all variables except for PAYOUT, OPTIONS, DIVYIELD and the dummy variable STOCKRET, for which 
we calculate means. Ex-ante means that variable calculations are based on three-year averages preceding the 
initial  repurchase  event  (years  -3  to  -1).  Ex-post  means  that  calculations  are  based  on  three-year  averages 
subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 0 to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for 
PAYOUT, OPTIONS, DIVYIELD and the dummy variable STOCKRET1. A non-parametric Mann/Whitney 
ranksum test on differences in medians between these two samples of firms is conducted for all other variables. 
The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance at 
10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
Variables  Event Firms (R1) 
 
Non-Repurchase Firms (R0) 
  Ex-Ante  Ex-Post  Difference  Ex-Ante  Ex-Post  Difference 
SIZE  4.941  5.617  0.676***  4.944  5.622  0.678*** 
PAYOUT  0.121  0.127  0.006  0.069  0.067  -0.002 
LEVERAGE  0.124  0.144  0.020  0.148  0.177  0.029 
CASH  0.167  0.121  -0.056**  0.124  0.106  -0.018 
CASH FLOW  0.100  0.092  -0.008  0.071  0.070  -0.001 
UNDERP  2.498  2.137  -0.361***  2.054  1.890  -0.164 
GROWTH  0.115  0.108  -0.007*  0.120  0.102  -0.018*** 
PROFIT  0.064  0.047  -0.017***  0.040  0.028  -0.012*** 
OPRISK  0.035  0.035  0.000  0.039  0.046  0.007* 
OPTIONS  0.042  0.022  -0.020***  0.041  0.021  -0.020*** 
NONOPINC  0.009  0.008  -0.001  0.008  0.006  -0.002*** 
EPSGRW  0.010  -0.007  -0.017  0.023  0.000  -0.023*** 
SALESGRW  0.251  0.080  -0.171***  0.264  0.075  -0.179*** 
RETEARN  0.338  0.397  0.059  0.292  0.303  0.011 
DIVYIELD  0.008  0.006  -0.003  0.006  0.008  0.001 
STOCKRET  0.182  0.101  -0.081***  0.043  0.091  0.048 
STOCKRET1  0.634  0.630  -0.004  0.512  0.588  0.076*** 
 
 
Table 3D: Ex-Ante Descriptive Statistics for Event Firms and Secondary Repurchase Control Firms  
Summary  descriptive  statistics  for  initial  repurchase  firms  (R1)  and  for  secondary  repurchase  matched-pairs 
control  firms  (R2).  Ex-ante  means  that  calculations  are  based  on  three-year  averages  preceding  the  initial 
repurchase  event  (years  -3  to  -1).  A  t-test  on  differences  in  means  is  performed  for  PAYOUT,  OPTIONS, 
DIVYIELD  and  the  dummy  variable  STOCKRET1.  A  non-parametric  Mann/Whitney  ranksum  test  on 
differences in medians between these two sub-samples of firms is conducted for all other variables. The sign *** 
denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance at 10%-level. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
Variables  Event Firms (R1) 
 




  Mean  St. Dev.  Median  Mean  St. Dev.  Median  or Means 
SIZE  5.710  1.405  5.404  5.989  1.314  5.675   
PAYOUT  0.152  0.742  0.000  0.213  0.777  0.000  ** 
LEVERAGE  0.196  0.184  0.165  0.246  0.238  0.191  *** 
CASH  0.330  0.551  0.111  0.226  0.431  0.075  *** 
CASH FLOW  0.098  0.088  0.098  0.092  0.088  0.090  * 
UNDERP  3.281  4.074  2.302  2.696  4.361  1.839  *** 
GROWTH  0.126  0.098  0.104  0.119  0.093  0.100   
PROFIT  0.050  0.126  0.058  0.029  0.138  0.041  *** 
OPRISK  0.060  0.110  0.029  0.065  0.129  0.031  * 
OPTIONS  0.039  0.067  0.000  0.040  0.070  0.010   
NONOPINC  0.010  0.015  0.007  0.012  0.021  0.008   
EPSGRW  0.319  1.005  0.055  -0.044  6.545  0.000  ** 
SALESGRW  3.089  68.92  0.227  0.241  0.933  0.101  *** 
RETEARN  0.218  1.234  0.327  0.143  10.28  0.530  *** 
DIVYIELD  0.008  0.032  0.000  0.012  0.029  0.000  ** 
STOCKRET  1.144  15.58  0.163  0.208  0.598  0.101  *** 
STOCKRET1  0.597  0.491  1.000  0.585  0.493  1.000   
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Table 3E: Ex-Post Descriptive Statistics for Event Firms and Secondary Repurchase Firms 
Summary descriptive statistics for event firms (R1) and for secondary repurchase matched-pairs control firms 
(R2). Ex-post means that calculations are based on three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event 
(years 0 to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for PAYOUT, OPTIONS, DIVYIELD and the 
dummy  variable  STOCKRET1.  A  non-parametric  Mann/Whitney  ranksum  test  on  differences  in  medians 
between these two samples of firms is conducted for all other variables. The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-
level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable 
definitions and text for details. 
Variables  Event Firms (R1) 
 




  Mean  St. Dev.  Median  Mean  St. Dev.  Median  or Means 
SIZE  6.271  1.311  5.916  6.237  1.317  5.910   
PAYOUT  0.148  0.666  0.000  0.243  1.551  0.000  ** 
LEVERAGE  0.208  0.181  0.188  0.247  0.230  0.206  *** 
CASH  0.268  0.439  0.084  0.234  0.536  0.073  ** 
CASH FLOW  0.097  0.071  0.093  0.089  0.092  0.090   
UNDERP  2.671  2.711  2.129  2.263  3.691  1.755  *** 
GROWTH  0.115  0.086  0.098  0.107  0.087  0.088  ** 
PROFIT  0.037  0.094  0.047  0.012  0.141  0.036  *** 
OPRISK  0.057  0.086  0.030  0.075  0.146  0.033  ** 
OPTIONS  0.022  0.045  0.000  0.024  0.057  0.000   
NONOPINC  0.009  0.016  0.006  0.009  0.020  0.006   
EPSGRW  -0.742  13.18  -0.007  -0.428  7.452  0.000   
SALESGRW  0.113  0.357  0.074  0.057  0.151  0.044  *** 
RETEARN  0.189  4.233  0.402  0.535  5.556  0.564  *** 
DIVYIELD  0.008  0.022  0.000  0.013  0.049  0.000  ** 
STOCKRET  0.240  1.222  0.123  0.304  1.723  0.086   
STOCKRET1  0.662  0.473  1.000  0.620  0.486  1.000  * 
 
 
Table 3F: Ex-Post Versus Ex-Ante Medians for Event Firms and Secondary Repurchase Firms 
In this table, we calculate medians for event firms (R1) and for secondary repurchase matched-pairs control firms 
(R2) for all variables except for PAYOUT, OPTIONS, DIVYIELD and the dummy variable STOCKRET, for 
which we calculate means. Ex-ante means that variable calculations are based on three-year averages preceding 
the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). Ex-post means that calculations are based on three-year averages 
subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 0 to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for 
PAYOUT, OPTIONS, DIVYIELD and the dummy variable STOCKRET1. A non-parametric Mann/Whitney 
ranksum test on differences in medians between these two samples of firms is conducted for all other variables. 
The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance at 
10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
Variables  Event Firms (R1) 
 
Secondary Repurchase Firms (R2) 
  Ex-Ante  Ex-Post  Difference  Ex-Ante  Ex-Post  Difference 
SIZE  5.404  5.916  0.512***  5.675  5.910  0.235** 
PAYOUT  0.152  0.148  -0.004  0.213  0.243  0.030 
LEVERAGE  0.165  0.188  0.025  0.191  0.206  0.015 
CASH  0.111  0.084  -0.027***  0.075  0.073  -0.002 
CASH FLOW  0.098  0.093  -0.005  0.090  0.090  0.000 
UNDERP  2.310  2.129  -0.171*  1.839  1.755  -0.084*** 
GROWTH  0.104  0.098  -0.004*  0.100  0.088  -0.012** 
PROFIT  0.058  0.047  -0.009***  0.041  0.036  -0.005*** 
OPRISK  0.029  0.030  0.001  0.033  0.031  0.002 
OPTIONS  0.039  0.022  -0.017***  0.040  0.024  -0.016*** 
NONOPINC  0.007  0.006  -0.001  0.008  0.006  -0.002*** 
EPSGRW  0.055  -0.007  -0.062***  0.000  0.000  0.000 
SALESGRW  0.227  0.074  -0.153***  0.101  0.044  -0.057*** 
RETEARN  0.327  0.402  0.075***  0.530  0.564  0.034 
DIVYIELD  0.008  0.008  0.000  0.012  0.013  0.001 
STOCKRET  0.163  0.123  -0.040***  0.101  0.086  -0.015 
STOCKRET1  0.597  0.662  0.065**  0.585  0.620  0.035 
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Table 3G: Dividend Characteristics of Event Firms (R1) and Both Control Samples’ Firms (R0 and R2) 
Summary dividend characteristics for event firms (R1) and for both matched-pairs control firms (R0 and R2). See 
text for details. 
 
Panel 1: Ex-Ante Cash Dividends Characteristics 






































Panel 2: Ex-Post Cash Dividends Characteristics 






































Panel 3: Changes in Cash Dividends 




  n = 1,247  n = 630  n = 716  n = 782  n = 630  n = 899  n = 716 
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Table 3H: Ex-Ante Medians for Event Firms (R1) in Different Time Windows 
Summary descriptive statistics for all event firms (R1) sample in different time periods (1,247 observations in 
each period). For PAYOUT, OPTIONS, DIVYIELD and the dummy variable STOCKRET1, we use the mean 
value instead of the median. Ex-ante means that calculations are based on three-year averages preceding the 
initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). An Anova F Statistic and a non-parametric Chi-Square ranksum test on 
differences in means and medians, respectively, between these two sub-samples of firms are conducted, where 
*** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance at 10%-
level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Variables  1980-1987  1988-1992  1993-1997  1998-2002  Differences 
 
SIZE  4.728  5.036  5.239  5.386  *** 
PAYOUT  0.391  0.174  0.145  0.072  *** 
LEVERAGE  0.204  0.190  0.159  0.135  ** 
CASH  0.159  0.129  0.105  0.198   
CASH FLOW  0.119  0.103  0.102  0.085  *** 
UNDERP  2.250  2.059  2.348  2.539  * 
GROWTH  0.150  0.102  0.102  0.100   
PROFIT  0.074  0.065  0.062  0.053  ** 
OPRISK  0.025  0.027  0.028  0.031   
OPTIONS  0.034  0.069  0.075  0.078  *** 
NONOPINC  0.014  0.011  0.007  0.007  *** 
EPSGRW  0.000  0.037  0.046  0.005   
SALESGRW  0.254  0.211  0.199  0.284  *** 
RETEARN  0.518  0.400  0.342  0.235  *** 
DIVYIELD  0.013  0.012  0.009  0.004  *** 
STOCKRET  0.146  0.189  0.174  0.172   
STOCKRET1  0.662  0.584  0.547  0.649  *** 
 
 Table 3I: Correlations Matrix for the Explanatory Variables 
Correlation statistics for ex-ante event firms (R1) observations used with the non-repurchase matched pairs control firms (R0). Ex-ante means that calculations are based on three-year 
averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Panel 1: Correlation Matrix for the Non-Repurchase Sample 
R1 (R0 
SAMPLE) 
SIZE  PAYOUT  LEVER 
AGE 




GROWTH  PROFIT  OPTIONS  NON 
OPIN
C 












0,169  0,114  -0,151  0,042  -0,051  -0,185  -0,014  -0,161  -0,034  -0,100  0,020  -0,046  0,124  -0,027  -0,043  -0,136 
PAYOUT    1,000  0,029  -0,080  0,095  -0,031  -0,037  0,031  -0,048  -0,028  -0,056  -0,009  -0,002  0,722  -0,024  -0,106  -0,053 
LEVERAGE      1,000  -0,367  -0,122  -0,221  -0,130  -0,138  -0,057  -0,035  -0,019  0,084  0,042  -0,000  0,063  -0,108  0,013 
CASH        1,000  -0,098  0,417  0,140  -0,154  0,013  0,182  -0,024  -0,012  -0,017  -0,087  0,004  0,081  0,231 
CASHFLOW          1,000  0,095  0,111  0,620  0,048  -0,073  0,016  -0,096  0,045  0,066  0,018  0,119  -0,244 
UNDERP            1,000  0,184  -0,004  -0,049  0,046  -0,003  -0,010  -0,029  -0,051  0,018  0,135  0,116 
GROWTH              1,000  -0,117  0,093  0,003  -0,009  0,137  0,042  -0,080  -0,020  -0,005  0,106 
PROFIT                1,000  0,085  0,114  0,024  -0,048  0,012  0,036  0,011  0,111  -0,422 
OPTIONS                  1,000  0,016  0,078  -0,026  0,076  -0,048  0,168  0,036  -0,057 
NONOPINC                    1,000  -0,003  0,007  -0,006  -0,028  -0,009  0,056  0,282 
EPSGW                      1,000  -0,004  0,040  -0,017  0,007  0,016  -0,058 
SALESGW                        1,000  -0,007  -0,009  -0,006  0,029  -0,000 
RETEARN                          1,000  -0,016  0,012  0,039  0,064 
DIVYIELD                            1,000  -0,024  -0,078  -0,054 
STRET                              1,000  0,120  0,014 
STRETR1                                1,000  0,016 
OPRISK                                  1,000 
  
- 65 - 
 
Correlation statistics for ex-ante event firms (R1) observations used with the secondary repurchase matched pairs control firms (R2). Ex-ante means that calculations are based on 
three-year averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Panel 2: Correlation Matrix for the Secondary-Repurchase Sample 
R1 (R2 
SAMPLE) 
SIZE  PAYOUT  LEVER 
AGE 




GROWTH  PROFIT  OPTIONS  NON 
OPIN
C 










0,096  0,156  -0,230  -0,031  -0,101  -0,175  -0,043  -0,208  -0,032  -0,127  0,006  0,003  0,146  0,006  -0,090  -0,174 
PAYOUT    1,000  0,048  -0,074  0,063  -0,012  -0,029  0,020  -0,056  -0,011  -0,028  -0,009  0,003  0,579  -0,012  -0,077  -0,041 
LEVERAGE      1,000  -0,411  -0,161  -0,191  -0,176  -0,145  -0,058  -0,234  -0,025  0,070  0,008  0,002  0,034  -0,111  -0,088 
CASH        1,000  -0,072  0,371  0,190  -0,164  0,061  0,352  -0,016  -0,010  -0,071  -0,091  -0,018  0,075  0,351 
CASHFLOW          1,000  0,147  0,164  0,611  0,043  0,043  0,005  -0,080  0,231  0,077  0,014  0,129  -0,308 
UNDERP            1,000  0,123  0,055  -0,019  0,063  0,003  -0,013  -0,092  -0,044  -0,025  0,152  0,206 
GROWTH              1,000  -0,062  0,113  0,087  -0,002  0,117  -0,026  -0,050  -0,012  0,041  0,181 
PROFIT                1,000  0,079  0,053  0,023  -0,030  0,266  0,031  -0,085  0,094  -0,565 
OPTIONS                  1,000  0,038  0,047  -0,022  0,034  -0,053  0,022  0,016  -0,058 
NONOPINC                    1,000  -0,108  0,011  0,128  0,013  -0,028  0,087  0,004 
EPSGW                      1,000  -0,004  -0,033  0,002  -0,001  0,050  0,023 
SALESGW                        1,000  -0,018  -0,011  -0,002  0,031  -0,003 
RETEARN                          1,000  0,023  0,058  0,007  -0,258 
DIVYIELD                            1,000  -0,013  -0,054  -0,039 
STRET                              1,000  0,060  0,056 
STRETR1                                1,000  0,055 
OPRISK                                  1,000 
  
Table 3J: Ex-Ante, Ex-Post and Changes in Medians for Firms Included in Both the Event 
Sample and the Non-Repurchases Sample 
In this table, we calculate ex-ante, ex-post and changes over time in means or medians for the 56 firms that are 
included in both the event sample (R1) and the non-repurchase matched-pairs control sample (R0). We compute 
medians for all variables except for PAYOUT, OPTIONS, DIVYIELD and the dummy variable STRETR1, to 
which we calculate means. Ex-ante means that variable calculations are based on three-year averages preceding 
the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). Ex-post means that calculations are based on three-year averages 
subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 0 to +2). A t-test on differences in means is performed for 
PAYOUT,  OPTIONS,  DIVYIELD  and  the  dummy  variable  STRETR1.  A  non-parametric  Mann/Whitney 
ranksum test on differences in medians between these two firms is conducted for all other variables. The sign *** 
denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance at 10%-level. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




SIZE  5.443  4.580  ***  5.932  5.464  ***  *** 
PAYOUT  0.069  0.108    0.151  0.153     
LEVERAGE  0.168  0.115    0.176  0.178     
CASH  0.104  0.101    0.110  0.131     
CASH FLOW  0.117  0.110    0.104  0.104     
UNDERP  2.847  2.613    2.370  2.720     
GROWTH  0.130  0.118    0.124  0.128     
PROFIT  0.056  0.062    0.043  0.040    * 
OPRISK  0.035  0.036           
OPTIONS  0.030  0.068  ***  0.009  0.030  **  *** 
NONOPINC  0.008  0.009    0.008  0.010     
EPSGRW  0.041  0.151    0.163  0.086     
SALESGRW  0.247  0.330  *  0.084  0.138    *** 
RETEARN  0.283  0.278    0.403  0.294    * 
DIVYIELD  0.004  0.005    0.010  0.006     
STOCKRET  0.194  0.237    0.162  0.161     
STOCKRET1  0.643  0.589    0.679  0.696     
AGE  7.804  4.696  ***         
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Table 3L: Ex-Ante, Ex-Post and Changes in Medians for Firms Included in Both the Event 
Sample and the Secondary Repurchases Sample 
In this table, we calculate ex-ante, ex-post and changes over time in means or medians for the 131 firms that are 
included in both the event sample (R1) and the secondary repurchase matched-pairs control sample (R2). We 
compute  medians  for  all  variables  except  for  PAYOUT,  OPTIONS,  DIVYIELD  and  the  dummy  variable 
STRETR1,  to  which  we  calculate  means.  Ex-ante  means  that  variable  calculations  are  based  on  three-year 
averages preceding the initial repurchase event (years -3 to -1). Ex-post means that calculations are based on 
three-year averages subsequent to the initial repurchase event (years 0 to +2). A t-test on differences in means is 
performed  for  PAYOUT,  OPTIONS,  DIVYIELD  and  the  dummy  variable  STRETR1.  A  non-parametric 
Mann/Whitney  ranksum  test  on  differences  in  medians  between  these  two  firms  is  conducted  for  all  other 
variables. The sign *** denotes significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes 
significance at 10%-level. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
Ex-Ante 
 
Ex-Post   
 




SIZE  4.862  5.381  ***  5.522  5.745  *  *** 
PAYOUT  0.182  0.158    0.095  0.085     
LEVERAGE  0.128  0.154    0.164  0.159     
CASH  0.109  0.111    0.093  0.092     
CASH FLOW  0.104  0.095    0.098  0.095     
UNDERP  2.464  2.194    2.135  1.855  *   
GROWTH  0.105  0.103    0.107  0.094     
PROFIT  0.068  0.053    0.049  0.038    ** 
OPRISK  0.027  0.032    0.040  0.031    ** 
OPTIONS  0.051  0.055    0.032  0.019  **  *** 
NONOPINC  0.009  0.009    0.008  0.006  **   
EPSGRW  0.077  0.007    0.008  0.012     
SALESGRW  0.245  0.168  ***  0.073  0.075    *** 
RETEARN  0.418  0.438    0.462  0.468    * 
DIVYIELD  0.006  0.007    0.008  0.008     
STOCKRET  0.239  0.138    0.144  0.128    ** 
STOCKRET1  0.611  0.611    0.649  0.664     
AGE  5.718  8.527  ***         
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Table 4A: Medians for Event Firms (R1) according to Market-to-Book Quartiles 
Medians for ex ante variables for event firms (R1). For the dummy variable STOCKRET1 we use the mean value 
instead of the median. The event firms are sorted into quartile groups according to market-to-book (a higher 
group represents a higher quartile). Ex-ante means that calculations are based on three-year averages prior to the 
initial repurchase event. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Variables  Event Firms (R1) 
 
  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Pattern of Change 
SIZE  5,06  4,93  4,77  4,99  Stable 
PAYOUT  0,17  0,10  0,08  0,13  U-shaped 
LEVERAGE  0,21  0,20  0,09  0,03  Decrease 
CASH  0,07  0,08  0,26  0,54  Increase 
CASH FLOW  0,08  0,09  0,11  0,14  Increase 
UNDERP  0,99  1,89  3,15  6,04  Increase 
GROWTH  0,09  0,10  0,12  0,14  Increase 
PROFIT  0,03  0,06  0,09  0,09  Increase 
OPRISK  0,03  0,03  0,04  0,05  Increase 
OPTIONS  0,00  0,03  0,02  0,00  Inverted U-shaped 
NONOPINC  0,01  0,01  0,01  0,01  Stable 
EPSGRW  0,00  0,04  0,04  0,01  Inverted U-shaped 
SALESGRW  0,14  0,19  0,29  0,38  Increase 
RETEARN  0,35  0,39  0,32  0,30  Irregular 
DIVYIELD  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  Stable 
STOCKRET  0,00  0,18  0,35  0,42  Increase 
STOCKRET1  0,41  0,68  0,73  0,72  Increase 
 
 
Table 4B: Medians for No-Repurchases Firms (R0) according to Market-to-Book Quartiles 
Medians for ex ante variables for non-repurchase firms (R0). For the dummy variable STOCKRET1 we use the 
mean value instead of the median. The event firms are sorted into quartile groups according to market-to-book (a 
higher group represents a higher quartile). Ex-ante means that calculations are based on three-year averages prior 
to the initial repurchase event. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Variables  No Repurchases Firms (R0) 
 
  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Pattern of Change 
SIZE  4,95  5,00  4,79  5,10  Stable 
PAYOUT  0,18  0,20  0,12  0,09  Decrease 
LEVERAGE  0,21  0,14  0,13  0,08  Decrease 
CASH  0,08  0,11  0,12  0,28  Increase 
CASH FLOW  0,08  0,08  0,06  0,04  Decrease 
UNDERP  1,66  2,04  2,25  2,16  Increase 
GROWTH  0,11  0,12  0,11  0,15  Stable 
PROFIT  0,04  0,05  0,05  0,00  Increase 
OPRISK  0,03  0,03  0,05  0,06  Increase 
OPTIONS  0,04  0,06  0,00  0,00  Decrease 
NONOPINC  0,01  0,01  0,01  0,01  Stable 
EPSGRW  0,00  0,08  0,02  0,03  Irregular 
SALESGRW  0,15  0,21  0,38  0,39  Increase 
RETEARN  0,51  0,31  0,22  0,18  Decrease 
DIVYIELD  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  Stable 
STOCKRET  0,05  0,07  0,12  0,00  Irregular 
STOCKRET1  0,53  0,46  0,59  0,48  Irregular 
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Table 4C: Medians for Event Firms (R1) according to Market-to-Book Quartiles 
Medians for ex ante variables for event firms (R1) that will match secondary repurchase firms. For the dummy 
variable STOCKRET1 we use the mean value instead of the median. The event firms are sorted into quartile 
groups according to market-to-book. A higher group represents a higher quartile. Ex-ante means that calculations 
are based on three-year averages prior to the initial repurchase event. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text 
for details. 
 
Variables  Event Firms (R1) 
 
  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Pattern of Change 
SIZE  5,85  5,37  5,39  5,12  Decrease 
PAYOUT  0,15  0,15  0,07  0,08  Decrease 
LEVERAGE  0,23  0,22  0,13  0,04  Decrease 
CASH  0,06  0,08  0,15  0,38  Increase 
CASH FLOW  0,07  0,09  0,11  0,14  Increase 
UNDERP  0,84  1,80  2,90  5,50  Increase 
GROWTH  0,08  0,10  0,11  0,14  Increase 
PROFIT  0,03  0,05  0,07  0,10  Increase 
OPRISK  0,03  0,03  0,03  0,04  Stable 
OPTIONS  0,00  0,03  0,00  0,00  Stable 
NONOPINC  0,00  0,01  0,01  0,01  Stable 
EPSGRW  0,00  0,12  0,11  0,12  Stable 
SALESGRW  0,12  0,24  0,23  0,35  Increase 
RETEARN  0,23  0,36  0,34  0,33  Stable 
DIVYIELD  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  Stable 
STOCKRET  0,00  0,19  0,35  0,41  Increase 
STOCKRET1  0,33  0,62  0,71  0,73  Increase 
 
 
Table 4D: Medians for Secondary Repurchase Firms (R2) according to Market-to-Book Quartiles 
Medians for ex ante variables for secondary repurchase firms (R2). For the dummy variable STOCKRET1 we use 
the mean value instead of the median. The event firms are sorted into quartile groups according to market-to-
book.  A  higher  group  represents  a  higher  quartile.  Ex-ante  means  that  calculations  are  based  on  three-year 
averages prior to the initial repurchase event. See Table 2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Variables  Secondary Repurchases Firms (R2) 
 
  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Pattern of Change 
SIZE  5,87  5,50  5,70  5,63  Stable 
PAYOUT  0,18  0,15  0,14  0,16  Stable 
LEVERAGE  0,23  0,20  0,19  0,16  Decrease 
CASH  0,06  0,07  0,06  0,12  Increase 
CASH FLOW  0,09  0,09  0,09  0,09  Stable 
UNDERP  1,79  1,82  1,82  2,10  Increase 
GROWTH  0,10  0,10  0,10  0,10  Stable 
PROFIT  0,04  0,04  0,04  0,04  Stable 
OPRISK  0,03  0,03  0,03  0,04  Stable 
OPTIONS  0,00  0,01  0,01  0,01  Stable 
NONOPINC  0,01  0,01  0,01  0,01  Stable 
EPSGRW  -0,04  0,07  0,00  -0,01  Irregular 
SALESGRW  0,08  0,10  0,10  0,12  Increase 
RETEARN  0,53  0,63  0,62  0,41  Inverted U-shaped 
DIVYIELD  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  Stable 
STOCKRET  0,11  0,09  0,07  0,13  U-shaped 
STOCKRET1  0,59  0,55  0,60  0,59  Stable 
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Pattern of Change 
  R1 (R0)  R0  R1 (R2)  R2 
SIZE  Stable  Stable  Decrease  Stable 
PAYOUT  U-shaped  Decrease  Decrease  Stable 
LEVERAGE  Decrease  Decrease  Decrease  Decrease 
CASH  Increase  Increase  Increase  Increase 
CASH FLOW  Increase  Decrease  Increase  Stable 
UNDERP  Increase  Increase  Increase  Increase 
GROWTH  Increase  Stable  Increase  Stable 
PROFIT  Increase  Increase  Increase  Stable 
OPRISK  Increase  Increase  Stable  Stable 
OPTIONS  Inverted U-shaped  Decrease  Stable  Stable 
NONOPINC  Stable  Stable  Stable  Stable 
EPSGRW  Inverted U-shaped  Irregular  Stable  Irregular 
SALESGRW  Increase  Increase  Increase  Increase 
RETEARN  Irregular  Decrease  Stable  Inverted U-shaped 
DIVYIELD  Stable  Stable  Stable  Stable 
STOCKRET  Increase  Irregular  Increase  U-shaped 
STOCKRET1  Increase  Irregular  Increase  Stable 
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Table 5.A:Logistic Regressions of Initial Repurchase Firms and Non-Repurchase Firms  
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions predicting initial repurchasing likelihood from a 
sample of initial repurchase firms and a matched-pairs control sample of non-repurchase firms. The first model 
uses absolute values for all variables. The second model employs the same absolute values for all variables and 
additional changes (ex-post values less ex-ante values) in some of the variables to allow empirical testing for 
some hypotheses. Definitions of the variables employed here are provided in section 4. The sign *** denotes 
significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 
2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Panel 1: All Observations 
All observations 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variables 
Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
SIZE  0.075  0.168  0.043  0.444 
PAYOUT  0.034  0.455  0.044  0.479 
LEVERAGE  -1.341  0.000***  -1.518  0.000*** 
CASH  -0.133  0.061*  -0.142  0.120 
CASH FLOW  3.541  0.000***  3.952  0.001*** 
UNDERP  -0.008  0.539  -0.045  0.080* 
GROWTH  -2.184  0.000***  -1.646  0.035** 
PROFIT  -0.788  0.281  -0.128  0.902 
OPRISK  -1.348  0.065*  -2.329  0.009*** 
OPTIONS  -0.068  0.935  -0.414  0.630 
NONOPINC  3.477  0.180  4.510  0.080* 
EPSGRW  -0.005  0.473  -0.006  0.429 
SALESGRW  0.038  0.213  0.085  0.098 
RETEARN  -0.005  0.580  -0.003  0.615 
DIVYIELD  -0.255  0.820  -0.250  0.873 
STOCKRET  0.033  0.262  0.086  0.487 
STOCKRET1  0.481  0.000***  0.691  0.001*** 
AGE  -0.062  0.000***  -0.067  0.000*** 
CHPAYOUT      -0.007  0.874 
CHLEVERAGE      -0.849  0.064* 
CHCASH      -0.043  0.780 
CHCASH FLOW      1.212  0.278 
CHUNDERP      -0.058  0.020** 
CHGROWTH      1.048  0.276 
CHPROFIT      1.202  0.160 
CHOPRISK      -1.108  0.084* 
CHSALESGRW      0.036  0.437 
CHSTOCKRET      0.050  0.675 
CHSTOCKRET1      0.152  0.320 
McFadden R-squared    8.44%    10.66% 
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Panel 2: Dividend Payers and Non-Dividend Payers 
Dividend Payers  Non-Dividend Payers 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  0.035  0.700  -0.039  0.698  0.042  0.576  0.009  0.911 
PAYOUT  0.198  0.326  -0.181  0.548         
LEVERAGE  -1.743  0.010**  -1.565  0.040**  -1.027  0.006***  -1.316  0.001*** 
CASH  -0.737  0.002***  -0.500  0.244  -0.060  0.406  -0.085  0.426 
CASH FLOW  7.266  0.001***  6.077  0.019**  2.732  0.002***  3.592  0.013** 
UNDERP  -0.025  0.274  -0.019  0.701  -0.002  0.892  -0.072  0.026** 
GROWTH  -3.117  0.015**  -1.370  0.416  -2.217  0.002***  -1.719  0.069* 
PROFIT  2.274  0.295  2.3040  0.388  -0.949  0.220  -0.229  0.840 
OPRISK  1.491  0.587  -1.759  0.605  -1.582  0.037**  -2.574  0.006*** 
OPTIONS  -3.210  0.077*  -3.187  0.076*  1.226  0.262  0.879  0.445 
NONOPINC  -2.217  0.767  -5.594  0.444  3.950  0.143  5.298  0.034** 
EPSGRW  -0.001  0.924  -0.010  0.314  -0.009  0.322  -0.011  0.325 
SALESGRW  -0.167  0.183  -1.646  0.076*  0.041  0.081*  0.117  0.012** 
RETEARN  -0.064  0.616  -0.042  0.780  -0.004  0.468  -0.002  0.638 
DIVYIELD  16.63  0.152  21.49  0.186         
STOCKRET  0.048  0.812  -0.419  0.335  0.067  0.334  0.288  0.067* 
STOCKRET1  0.647  0.011**  0.994  0.031**  0.399  0.011**  0.597  0.019** 
AGE  -0.082  0.000***  -0.089  0.000***  -0.050  0.000***  -0.058  0.000*** 
CHPAYOUT      0.019  0.880      -0.030  0.416 
CHLEVERAGE      -0.826  0.380      -0.824  0.141 
CHCASH      0.135  0.780      -0.093  0.571 
CHCASH FLOW      -0.683  0.797      1.604  0.274 
CHUNDERP      -0.012  0.799      -0.105  0.002*** 
CHGROWTH      3.116  0.166      0.820  0.469 
CHPROFIT      1.603  0.426      1.062  0.255 
CHOPRISK      -2.377  0.315      -0.966  0.102 
CHSALESGRW      -1.541  0.097*      0.059  0.143 
CHSTOCKRET      -0.529  0.169      0.220  0.122 
CHSTOCKRET1      0.384  0.255      0.143  0.444 
McFadden R-squared    19.72%    23.88%    6.59%    9.72% 
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Panel 3: Market-to-Book Quartiles (Model 2) 
M-B Quartile 1  M-B Quartile 2  M-B Quartile 3  M-B Quartile 4  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  0.056  0.666  0.018  0.869  0.067  0.651  0.004  0.979 
PAYOUT  -0.612  0.139  -0.116  0.725  -1.082  0.124  -0.516  0.370 
LEVERAGE  -1.746  0.042**  -0.833  0.306  -3.467  0.000***  -2.869  0.002*** 
CASH  -0.692  0.033**  -0.011  0.987  -0.431  0.170  0.070  0.759 
CASH FLOW  1.731  0.532  7.648  0.007***  0.375  0.860  9.593  0.002*** 
UNDERP  -0.689  0.005***  -0.342  0.001***  -0.080  0.143  0.172  0.040** 
GROWTH  3.056  0.130  -4.089  0.027**  -2.730  0.0793*  -1.922  0.313 
PROFIT  1.248  0.645  -6.037  0.069*  4.935  0.066*  0.431  0.840 
OPRISK  -1.628  0.536  -7.232  0.005***  -0.535  0.819  -5.397  0.010** 
OPTIONS  0.893  0.731  -0.071  0.968  1.152  0.507  -3.342  0.173 
NONOPINC  22.01  0.024**  1.273  0.905  -8.167  0.342  -6.589  0.567 
EPSGRW  0.002  0.878  -0.002  0.925  -0.008  0.577  -0.085  0.185 
SALESGRW  0.178  0.082*  -0.545  0.545  -1.455  0.173  0.052  0.942 
RETEARN  -0.0390  0.587  0.080  0.162  -0.001  0.997  -0.172  0.045** 
DIVYIELD  6.030  0.104  -13.36  0.113  8.898  0.513  19.22  0.141 
STOCKRET  0.347  0.121  0.450  0.225  0.051  0.891  -0.233  0.546 
STOCKRET1  0.353  0.489  1.260  0.007***  1.043  0.051*  0.481  0.306 
AGE  -0.109  0.000***  -0.068  0.000***  -0.061  0.003***  -0.026  0.216 
CHPAYOUT  -0.272  0.359  -0.078  0.171  -0.282  0.464  0.247  0.359 
CHLEVERAGE  -1.829  0.087*  -2.158  0.053*  -0.009  0.993  0.568  0.666 
CHCASH  -0.510  0.193  0.190  0.828  -0.566  0.340  -0.080  0.817 
CHCASH FLOW  -0.745  0.776  3.239  0.118  0.543  0.748  1.369  0.641 
CHUNDERP  -0.055  0.668  -0.302  0.001***  -0.012  0.820  -0.052  0.406 
CHGROWTH  3.437  0.200  2.156  0.412  -1.688  0.501  2.609  0.215 
CHPROFIT  3.727  0.127  -4.571  0.086*  1.758  0.423  3.229  0.129 
CHOPRISK  -1.745  0.398  -4.758  0.032**  0.493  0.768  -1.324  0.303 
CHSALESGRW  0.150  0.119  -0.696  0.435  -1.051  0.332  -0.067  0.927 
CHSTOCKRET  0.313  0.157  0.458  0.148  -0.381  0.245  -0.235  0.504 
CHSTOCKRET1  -0.013  0.971  0.373  0.272  0.344  0.320  0.189  0.616 
McFadden R-squared    25.60%    17.69%    20.70%    32.28% 
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Panel 4: Size Quartiles (Model 2) 
Size Quartile 1  Size Quartile 2  Size Quartile 3  Size Quartile 4  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  -0.871  0.001***  0.266  0.403  0.9315  0.005***  0.268  0.053* 
PAYOUT  -4.130  0.019**  -0.027  0.966  -0.492  0.207  -0.499  0.102 
LEVERAGE  -0.060  0.949  -1.891  0.014**  -1.696  0.039**  -2.398  0.002*** 
CASH  0.003  0.990  -0.402  0.266  -0.691  0.027**  1.130  0.004*** 
CASH FLOW  2.947  0.193  7.067  0.003***  3.463  0.161  7.310  0.043** 
UNDERP  -0.089  0.178  -0.027  0.663  -0.015  0.875  -0.041  0.484 
GROWTH  -2.180  0.193  -3.399  0.043**  -0.689  0.670  -2.681  0.227 
PROFIT  3.862  0.120  -1.323  0.354  2.078  0.304  -5.365  0.144 
OPRISK  -0.776  0.683  -1.979  0.638  -3.852  0.113  -9.421  0.010** 
OPTIONS  -0.530  0.732  0.336  0.850  0.509  0.797  0.853  0.730 
NONOPINC  -6.473  0.532  7.122  0.103  24.73  0.080*  -3.351  0.616 
EPSGRW  -0.055  0.131  -0.073  0.047**  0.018  0.210  -0.026  0.099* 
SALESGRW  -0.108  0.918  -0.302  0.719  -1.306  0.128  0.164  0.048** 
RETEARN  0.075  0.361  0.106  0.029**  -0.089  0.356  -0.655  0.0021*** 
DIVYIELD  4.480  0.760  -9.456  0.111  1.634  0.794  10.55  0.131 
STOCKRET  0.702  0.052*  0.013  0.969  0.530  0.088*  -0.112  0.715 
STOCKRET1  -0.710  0.138  0.860  0.094*  1.486  0.004**  1.739  0.000*** 
AGE  -0.066  0.003***  -0.1067  0.000***  -0.044  0.042**  -0.077  0.000*** 
CHPAYOUT  -0.599  0.214  -0.041  0.397  -0.108  0.542  -0.099  0.083* 
CHLEVERAGE  1.023  0.236  -1.455  0.158  0.021  0.985  -2.419  0.009*** 
CHCASH  -0.052  0.883  -0.076  0.868  -0.506  0.275  0.789  0.159 
CHCASH FLOW  1.177  0.507  1.904  0.298  0.577  0.831  1.316  0.684 
CHUNDERP  -0.057  0.395  -0.076  0.115  -0.170  0.110  0.003  0.956 
CHGROWTH  -2.179  0.360  2.255  0.268  4.045  0.045**  2.288  0.423 
CHPROFIT  0.909  0.654  0.602  0.698  4.264  0.039**  -0.444  0.826 
CHOPRISK  -0.294  0.838  -1.275  0.112  -3.356  0.123  -4.149  0.140 
CHSALESGRW  -0.188  0.858  -0.220  0.798  -1.292  0.131  0.159  0.054* 
CHSTOCKRET  0.344  0.254  -0.089  0.732  0.505  0.102  0.006  0.984 
CHSTOCKRET1  -0.771  0.026**  0.405  0.247  0.441  0.222  0.688  0.033** 
McFadden R-squared    17.97%    19.15%    21.45%    22.95% 
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Panel 5: Four Time Period Windows (Model 2) 
1982-1987  1988-1992  1993-1997  1998-2002  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  2.604  0.005***  0.146  0.568  0.095  0.433  -0.002  0.978 
PAYOUT  -5.312  0.027**  0.003  0.991  -0.354  0.246  0.149  0.099* 
LEVERAGE  2.323  0.437  -2.397  0.046**  -1.716  0.018**  -1.7851  0.000*** 
CASH  17.63  0.166  -0.056  0.957  -0.506  0.152  -0.067  0.486 
CASH FLOW  -5.180  0.714  -0.370  0.921  4.468  0.026**  6.012  0.000*** 
UNDERP  0.153  0.798  -0.282  0.068*  -0.015  0.783  -0.045  0.203 
GROWTH  2.780  0.797  1.536  0.546  -1.891  0.223  -2.407  0.048** 
PROFIT  -1.604  0.944  3.619  0.407  3.316  0.156  -1.882  0.156 
OPRISK  -36.52  0.178  -1.350  0.820  0.568  0.804  -4.445  0.000*** 
OPTIONS  -30.67  0.023**  2.132  0.651  0.789  0.649  3.696  0.236 
NONOPINC  -7.637  0.838  -6.295  0.662  5.169  0.248  4.110  0.488 
EPSGRW  0.326  0.359  -0.161  0.183  0.005  0.720  -0.009  0.392 
SALESGRW  -0.354  0.945  -1.063  0.624  -0.172  0.834  0.131  0.014** 
RETEARN  3.105  0.061*  0.272  0.136  -0.002  0.632  -0.067  0.169 
DIVYIELD  79.09  0.170  -2.745  0.675  3.353  0.432  -1.078  0.693 
STOCKRET  6.185  0.145  -2.219  0.096*  0.247  0.443  0.107  0.502 
STOCKRET1  2.527  0.343  2.770  0.008***  0.460  0.291  0.341  0.243 
AGE  -0.799  0.000***  -0.182  0.000***  -0.071  0.000***  -0.023  0.074* 
CHPAYOUT  -2.729  0.054**  -0.132  0.579  -0.050  0.713  0.089  0.195 
CHLEVERAGE  7.331  0.314  -2.854  0.074*  -0.738  0.410  -1.551  0.023** 
CHCASH  15.77  0.207  0.361  0.791  -0.545  0.211  0.055  0.739 
CHCASH FLOW  13.69  0.292  -3.189  0.254  2.762  0.174  2.706  0.084* 
CHUNDERP  -1.138  0.175  -0.206  0.162  0.014  0.786  -0.082  0.021** 
CHGROWTH  -18.38  0.162  4.538  0.329  0.658  0.713  1.809  0.277 
CHPROFIT  -16.57  0.048**  1.077  0.811  4.069  0.058*  0.281  0.787 
CHOPRISK  -15.46  0.261  2.151  0.570  0.428  0.815  -1.872  0.033** 
CHSALESGRW  -1.214  0.811  -0.986  0.650  -0.175  0.831  0.057  0.236 
CHSTOCKRET  6.239  0.138  -1.942  0.089*  0.120  0.686  0.137  0.353 
CHSTOCKRET1  -0.990  0.652  1.506  0.032**  0.138  0.646  -0.247  0.265 
McFadden R-squared    71.75%    26.07%    13.25%    13.41% 
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Table 5.B:Logistic Regressions of Initial Repurchase Firms and  Secondary Repurchase Firms 
This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regressions predicting initial repurchasing likelihood from a 
sample of initial repurchase firms and a matched-pairs control sample of secondary repurchase firms. The first 
model uses absolute values for all variables. The second model employs the same absolute values for all variables 
and additional changes (ex-post values less ex-ante values) in some of the variables to allow empirical testing for 
some hypotheses. Definitions of the variables employed here are provided in section 4. The sign *** denotes 
significance at 1%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and * denotes significance at 10%-level. See Table 
2 for variable definitions and text for details. 
 
Panel 1: All Observations 
All observations 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variables 
Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
SIZE  0.092  0.093*  0.082  0.144 
PAYOUT  0.067  0.493  0.104  0.320 
LEVERAGE  -1.472  0.000***  -1.332  0.001*** 
CASH  0.041  0.812  0.027  0.880 
CASH FLOW  -0.368  0.720  -1.910  0.151 
UNDERP  -0.007  0.628  -0.002  0.962 
GROWTH  -0.273  0.700  0.270  0.761 
PROFIT  1.259  0.214  3.276  0.025** 
OPRISK  -0.891  0.241  -1.969  0.095* 
OPTIONS  0.171  0.876  -0.429  0.708 
NONOPINC  -7.073  0.075*  -7.359  0.087* 
EPSGRW  0.002  0.789  0.001  0.783 
SALESGRW  0.062  0.398  1.013  0.031** 
RETEARN  0.003  0.961  0.002  0.921 
DIVYIELD  -4.205  0.086*  -4.266  0.101 
STOCKRET  0.447  0.003***  0.227  0.235 
STOCKRET1  -0.082  0.583  0.162  0.498 
AGE  -0.169  0.000***  -0.171  0.000*** 
CHPAYOUT      0.055  0.193 
CHLEVERAGE      0.520  0.366 
CHCASH      -0.321  0.148 
CHCASH FLOW      -0.796  0.521 
CHUNDERP      0.013  0.698 
CHGROWTH      0.295  0.829 
CHPROFIT      2.658  0.039** 
CHOPRISK      -1.055  0.286 
CHSALESGRW      0.854  0.061* 
CHSTOCKRET      -0.170  0.228 
CHSTOCKRET1      0.166  0.302 
McFadden R-squared    28.20%    30.46% 
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Panel 2: Dividend Payers and Non-Dividend Payers 
Dividend Payers  Non-Dividend Payers 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  0.051  0.554  0.005  0.956  0.053  0.502  0.060  0.472 
PAYOUT  0.279  0.049**  0.356  0.015**         
LEVERAGE  -1.649  0.014**  -1.871  0.018**  -1.403  0.001***  -0.957  0.039** 
CASH  -0.574  0.120  -0.823  0.064*  0.061  0.776  0.315  0.166 
CASH FLOW  0.484  0.827  -2.968  0.269  -0.659  0.547  -1.951  0.245 
UNDERP  0.008  0.838  0.006  0.913  -0.009  0.598  0.020  0.538 
GROWTH  -0.999  0.398  -0.514  0.742  -0.493  0.574  0.306  0.777 
PROFIT  3.835  0.242  7.575  0.016**  1.662  0.071*  3.459  0.041** 
OPRISK  -4.544  0.311  -5.083  0.136  -0.427  0.592  -0.729  0.603 
OPTIONS  -5.639  0.018**  -5.801  0.0213**  1.529  0.265  1.182  0.382 
NONOPINC  -9.012  0.299  -15.08  0.090*  -8.874  0.123  -8.921  0.103 
EPSGRW  -0.054  0.009***  -0.063  0.001***  0.020  0.267  0.013  0.271 
SALESGRW  -0.105  0.624  -0.200  0.835  0.276  0.107  1.866  0.006*** 
RETEARN  -0.194  0.605  -0.339  0.417  0.001  0.858  0.002  0.813 
DIVYIELD  7.728  0.329  7.183  0.346         
STOCKRET  0.636  0.010**  0.727  0.073*  0.395  0.028**  0.131  0.563 
STOCKRET1  -0.243  0.368  -0.325  0.477  -0.110  0.562  0.407  0.164 
AGE  -0.174  0.000***  -0.184  0.000***  -0.143  0.000***  -0.161  0.000*** 
CHPAYOUT      0.088  0.087*      -0.104  0.343 
CHLEVERAGE      0.905  0.456      0.240  0.733 
CHCASH      -1.942  0.000***      0.062  0.885 
CHCASH FLOW      -5.385  0.032**      0.734  0.632 
CHUNDERP      -0.029  0.3298      0.040  0.198 
CHGROWTH      1.073  0.693      0.259  0.868 
CHPROFIT      7.412  0.005***      1.911  0.200 
CHOPRISK      -0.850  0.723      -0.577  0.641 
CHSALESGRW      -0.366  0.690      1.577  0.015** 
CHSTOCKRET      0.075  0.776      -0.150  0.3393 
CHSTOCKRET1      -0.032  0.913      0.232  0.258 
McFadden R-squared    37.74%    41.74%    31.82%    38.68% 
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Panel 3: Market-to-Book Quartiles (Model 2) 
M-B Quartile 1  M-B Quartile 2  M-B Quartile 3  M-B Quartile 4  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  0.110  0.418  0.006  0.959  0.121  0.373  0.013  0.930 
PAYOUT  0.249  0.550  0.798  0.001***  -0.226  0.218  0.409  0.035** 
LEVERAGE  -3.316  0.007***  -2.149  0.040**  -2.064  0.006***  -0.861  0.331 
CASH  -0.746  0.345  -0.808  0.302  -0.740  0.042**  0.524  0.207 
CASH FLOW  -4.900  0.201  -4.314  0.245  -2.802  0.393  -3.534  0.235 
UNDERP  -0.717  0.167  -0.299  0.016**  -0.066  0.398  0.448  0.000*** 
GROWTH  -0.233  0.880  -1216  0.573  0.150  0.936  2.482  0.112 
PROFIT  0.805  0.855  2.383  0.510  4.740  0.196  4.702  0.122 
OPRISK  -3.758  0.292  -3.196  0.201  4.618  0.263  -6.041  0.087* 
OPTIONS  -1.882  0.590  -0.879  0.681  -0.150  0.946  0.706  0.783 
NONOPINC  8.634  0.516  -18.50  0.038**  10.81  0.190  -18.56  0.044** 
EPSGRW  0.008  0.698  0.010  0.467  0.004  0.884  -0.018  0.551 
SALESGRW  1.983  0.105  3.058  0.016**  0.707  0.507  -0.029  0.970 
RETEARN  -0.097  0.642  0.003  0.533  -0.032  0.801  0.032  0.390 
DIVYIELD  0.436  0.920  -5.569  0.475  -13.32  0.012**  -10.25  0.040** 
STOCKRET  0.091  0.538  -0.425  -0.436  0.719  0.131  -0.329  0.577 
STOCKRET1  -0.501  0.384  0.184  0.182  0.549  0.290  0.492  0.385 
AGE  -0.216  0.000***  -0.200  0.000***  -0.148  0.000***  -0.152  0.000*** 
CHPAYOUT  0.282  0.103  0.251  0.164  -0.011  0.895  0.172  0.186 
CHLEVERAGE  -0.357  0.875  0.118  0.939  1.953  0.082*  3.121  0.069* 
CHCASH  0.233  0.836  -0.370  0.679  -0.393  0.277  -0.168  0.681 
CHCASH FLOW  -1.526  0.615  -1.225  0.724  -3.720  0.103  -1.184  0.681 
CHUNDERP  -0.085  0.064*  -0.095  0313  0.011  0.834  0.170  0.001*** 
CHGROWTH  3.146  0.367  -3.453  0.179  3.665  0.245  -0.653  0.833 
CHPROFIT  1.506  0.692  2.171  0.509  3.846  0.140  3.895  0.223 
CHOPRISK  -2.341  0.496  -1.505  0.461  2.433  0.324  -4.622  0.134 
CHSALESGRW  1.426  0.244  2.692  0.028**  0.671  0.515  -0.077  0.922 
CHSTOCKRET  0.079  0.593  -1.132  0.006***  -0.300  0.317  -0.763  0.174 
CHSTOCKRET1  0.249  0.566  0.372  0.328  0.504  0.173  0.350  0.419 
McFadden R-squared    49.93%    39.93%    30.39%    44.61% 
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Panel 4: Size Quartiles (Model 2) 
Size Quartile 1  Size Quartile 2  Size Quartile 3  Size Quartile 4  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  -6.288  0.000***  -1.779  0.000***  -0.326  0.371  0.142  0.448 
PAYOUT  0.430  0.154  -0.122  0.480  -0.128  0.646  0.359  0.361 
LEVERAGE  -2.277  0.082*  0.291  0.735  -2.401  0.002***  -2.799  0.019** 
CASH  -0.011  0.983  0.907  0.072*  0.430  0.322  -0.430  0.636 
CASH FLOW  2.359  0.544  -1.606  0.546  1.032  0.763  -4.162  0.338 
UNDERP  -0.093  0.218  -0.043  0.550  0.010  0.837  0.004  0.962 
GROWTH  0.967  0.691  -1.765  0.295  -0.099  0.968  0.789  0.753 
PROFIT  3.263  0.504  2.665  0.323  -0552  0.876  -0.247  0.955 
OPRISK  -7.617  0.043**  -1.202  0.660  -6.020  0.031**  -3.093  0.478 
OPTIONS  2.027  0.442  -0.412  0.861  1.175  0.720  -2.981  0.426 
NONOPINC  -22.54  0.105  -7.641  0.491  -3.292  0.610  -6.948  0.566 
EPSGRW  -0.006  0.548  0.050  0.002***  0.028  0.571  -0.126  0.109 
SALESGRW  -0.006  0.997  0.257  0.841  1.797  0.157  1.444  0.415 
RETEARN  -0.001  0.811  0.045  0.151  -0.146  0.082*  -0.441  0.279 
DIVYIELD  -40.42  0.000***  -9.061  0.465  1.082  0.733  5.140  0.638 
STOCKRET  0.267  0.586  -0.590  0.121  -0.025  0.907  0.477  0.324 
STOCKRET1  -0.804  0.262  1.005  0.050**  0.145  0.775  0.802  0.215 
AGE  -0.225  0.000***  -0.153  0.000***  -0.167  0.000***  -0.196  0.000*** 
CHPAYOUT  0.361  0.006***  0.025  0.622  0.346  0.066*  0.226  0.156 
CHLEVERAGE  4.243  0.055*  2.107  0.147  -1.848  0.137  -1.191  0.485 
CHCASH  -0.924  0.118  0.128  0.866  1.202  0.044**  -1.316  0.233 
CHCASH FLOW  -5.229  0.094*  -3.105  0.138  1.201  0.697  6.294  0.089* 
CHUNDERP  -0.054  0.272  -0.027  0.713  0.061  0.185  -0.040  0.470 
CHGROWTH  -1.667  0.533  1.582  0.583  3.216  0.419  1.988  0.625 
CHPROFIT  9.740  0.002***  2.134  0.359  -5.020  0.134  0.868  0.784 
CHOPRISK  -3.065  0.254  -2.078  0.314  -7.289  0.014**  1.605  0.608 
CHSALESGRW  -0.140  0.946  0.085  0.943  1.558  0.216  1.775  0.292 
CHSTOCKRET  -0.637  0.141  -0.873  0.021**  -0.042  0.836  -0.097  0.508 
CHSTOCKRET1  -0.265  0.602  0.863  0.020**  -0.084  0.815  0.716  0.063* 
McFadden R-squared    62.81%    31.42%    32.12%    49.05% 
 
  
- 80 - 
 
Panel 5: Four Time Period Windows (Model 2) 
1982-1987  1988-1992  1993-1997  1998-2002  Variables 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value 
SIZE  4.110  0.117  0.470  0.212  0.164  0.135  0.110  0.135 
PAYOUT  0.164  0.756  0.130  0.728  0.832  0.077*  -0.201  0.392 
LEVERAGE  -7.101  0.444  -7.408  0.012**  -0.350  0.676  -1.519  0.002*** 
CASH  -0.728  0.893  -0.074  0.923  -0.467  0.318  0.353  0.117 
CASH FLOW  -5.888  0.557  -11.79  0.104  -5.000  0.095*  -1.115  0.487 
UNDERP  -0.060  0.779  0.024  0.868  -0.014  0.868  -0.018  0.569 
GROWTH  11.36  0.065*  5.028  0.167  1.906  0.347  -0.219  0.845 
PROFIT  32.07  0.111  10.80  0.184  6.821  0.032**  3.567  0.034** 
OPRISK  31.05  0.642  -5.033  0.398  -3.448  0.268  -1.423  0.274 
OPTIONS  21.17  0.277  -11.78  0.041**  -0.060  0.975  1.441  0.759 
NONOPINC  116.9  0.108  -36.45  0.203  14.63  0.222  -16.65  0.007*** 
EPSGRW  0.160  0.806  -0.047  0.295  0.021  0.080*  -0.012  0.502 
SALESGRW  -3.887  0.153  -1.090  0.705  1.158  0.480  1.389  0.082* 
RETEARN  -5.827  0.277  0.613  0.018**  -0.552  0.022**  0.017  0.264 
DIVYIELD  -38.81  0.115  -22.81  0.010**  -5.500  0.336  -0.323  0.942 
STOCKRET  2.563  0.467  -0.7842  0.253  0.900  0.065*  0.153  0.444 
STOCKRET1  1.967  0.057*  -1.739  0.243  0.209  0.684  0.212  0.523 
AGE  -2.003  0.048**  -0.547  0.000***  -0.195  0.000***  -0.120  0.000*** 
CHPAYOUT  -0.123  0.319  0.663  0.003***  0.686  0.049**  0.003  0.975 
CHLEVERAGE  1.652  0.441  0.336  0.878  0.111  0.921  0.403  0.607 
CHCASH  0.413  0.736  -0.991  0.346  -1.245  0.097*  -0.101  0.690 
CHCASH FLOW  -5.885  0.130  -21.66  0.011**  -0.857  0.781  1.100  0.454 
CHUNDERP  -0.243  0.036**  0.185  0.047**  0.110  0.089*  -0.020  0.479 
CHGROWTH  -3.104  0.496  -0.376  0.933  0.271  0.921  0.048  0.980 
CHPROFIT  -0.825  0.864  15.31  0.079*  1.831  0.533  2.664  0.078* 
CHOPRISK  -27.14  0.189  -2.483  0.711  -5.573  0.067*  -0.677  0.540 
CHSALESGRW  23.93  0.236  -1.226  0.657  -0.089  0.917  1.245  0.119 
CHSTOCKRET  1.284  0.099*  -3.077  0.044**  0.034  0.891  -0.103  0.494 
CHSTOCKRET1  -0.066  0.871  -0.156  0.877  0.451  0.178  0.119  0.594 
McFadden R-squared    87.91%    64.45%    40.75%    22.59% 
  




In this study, we use the following variables:  
 
- SIZE (measured as in Dittmar, 2000); 
 
In the matched-pairs approach, we control for size and industry but in the other empirical tests 
we use size as a proxy for information asymmetry (Vermaelen, 1981; Dittmar, 2000), because 
large firms are believed to have less uncertainty regarding future cash flows and, therefore, to 
have a lower level of information asymmetry. 
 
- PAYOUT (measured as in Dittmar, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002);  
 
We include the PAYOUT variable in the analysis because another common explanation for 
stock repurchases is that firms repurchase stock as a substitute for cash dividends since stock 
repurchases  are  associated  with  a  lower  tax  burden  for  stockholders  (capital  gains  versus 
ordinary income) and increased financial flexibility. 
 
- LEVERAGE (as measured in Bagwell and Shoven, 1989; Grullon and Michaely, 2002); 
 
We  use  LEVERAGE  to  account  for  the  effect  of  current  financial  risk  and  flexibility  in 
explaining stock repurchases. Presumably, if stock repurchasing firms are below their optimal 
capital  structure,  then  the  increase  in  leverage  associated  with  stock  repurchases  should 
increase firm value for reasons related to tax, agency and signaling considerations.  
 
- CASH (as measured in Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2002); 
 
We  include  CASH  to  test  whether  firms  engage  in  initial  stock  repurchases  to  distribute 
excess cash in response to agency, signaling or maturity considerations. In addition, CASH is 
used to check the possibility of dividend substitution by initial stock repurchases.   
 
- CASHFLOW (as measured in Jagannathan et al., 2000); 
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CASHFLOW is included to account for agency, signaling or maturity considerations, which 
all suggest that firms with high level of cash flow would benefit more by repurchasing stock. 
Hence, we test the hypothesis that this may not be the case for initial repurchases. 
 
- UNDERP (underpricing as measured in Jagannathan et al., 2000);  
 
Ikenberry et al (1995) show that firms with low market-to-book ratios earn abnormal returns 
in subsequent years. Thus, as this variable may indicate a firm’s potential for undervaluation 
and  future  abnormal  returns,  we  include  the  variable  UNDERP  to  capture  the  potential 
undervaluation  effect  driving  initial  repurchase  decisions.  We  estimate  the  association 
between  market-to-book  ratios  and  initial  repurchase  decisions  incremental  to  proxies  for 
actual and future growth, enabling us to interpret the coefficient on market-to-book ratios as 
relating  to  undervaluation  and  predict  a  positive  relation.  Also,  controlling  for  size,  we 
decrease the possibility for market-to-book ratios to proxy for information asymmetry. 
 
- GROWTH (growth options); 
 
The amount of capital, advertising and R&D expenditures is used to measure a firm’s reliance 
on  future  growth  opportunities  and,  hence,  to  help  test  agency,  signaling  or  maturity 
hypotheses for initial stock repurchases. In particular, we predict a different relation between 
growth and initial repurchases vis-à-vis secondary repurchases. 
 
- PROFIT (profitability as measured in Dittmar, 2000); 
 
We also use PROFIT to account for the effect of agency, signaling or maturity hypotheses in 
explaining initial stock repurchases.  
 
- OPRISK (operating risk as measured in Jagannathan et al., 2000; Jagannathan and Stephens, 
2003); 
 
In the matched-pairs approach, we control for size and industry in order to hold constant (at 
least partially) some economic attributes as is the case of operating risk. In the other tests, we 
use operating risk to present evidence supporting some of the most common explanations of 
stock repurchases, especially maturity and free cash flow theories. 
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- OPTIONS (stock options as measured in Dittmar, 2000; Kahle, 2002); 
 
The variable OPTIONS is included to test the management incentive to distribute cash by 
repurchasing  stock  in  order  to  avoid  earnings  per  share  dilution  and    reporting  earnings 
disappointments. 
 
- NONOPINC (Non operating income  as measured in Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan 
et al., 2000); 
 
We also use NONOPINC as a proxy for temporary cash flow to emphasize the potential role 
of initial stock repurchases as a flexible mechanism to distribute temporary cash flows and, 
hence,  to test the substitution effect between initial repurchases and dividends. 
 
- EPSGW (actual growth rate of earnings per share) and SALESGW (actual growth rate of 
sales) 
 
Sales and EPS growth are used as proxies for current growth that may be positively related to 
potential agency costs of free cash flows. EPS growth is also included following evidence 
reported by Brav et al (2005) that managers posit the desire to increase earnings per share 
among their list of repurchase reasons. 
 
- RETEARN (retained earnings as measured in DeAngelo et al., 2005); 
 
We proxy the firms’ stage in their financial lifecycle by using the earned-contributed capital 
mix variable of DeAngelo et al., (2005), that measures the extent to which the firm is self-
financing or reliant on external capital. The variable RETEARN is, therefore, included to 
capture  this  potential  life  cycle  effect,  that  allows  us  to  test  maturity  and  signaling 
considerations. In effect, firms in the early stages of their lifecycle have large and valuable 
investment opportunities and limited retained earnings, so they retain all internal cash flow 
available,  specially  when  external  financing  is  very  costly  due  to  larger  asymmetric 
information costs.  
 
-  STRET  (stock  returns)  and  STRET1  (dummy  variable  for  the  stock  returns  at  initial 
repurchase year) 
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These variables measure the managerial incentive to time the market with stock repurchase 
transactions and the degree of stocks’ potential undervaluation. In particular, STRET1 is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one when the return on the stock in the initial repurchase year 
is higher than the average return in the three-year period preceding the initial repurchase. 
 
- STREP (stock repurchase amount as suggested by Grullon and Michaely, 2002 and Banyi et 
al., 2005) and PROBINREP (stock initial repurchases); 
 
PROBINREP and STREP are the independent variables. PROBINREP is a dummy variable 
which  equals  one  if  the  observation  is  an  initial  stock  repurchase  transaction,  and  zero 
otherwise and STREP is  the amount of stock repurchased (in millions of US dollars). 
 
- INDUSTRY (industry dummies based on two or four digit SIC codes); 
 
Prior  research  has  identified  a  firm’s  industry  as  a  potentially  important  determinant  of 
financial decisions, specially high growth and competitive industries characterized by strong 
operating and technological risks and cyclical businesses . This is clearly also true for stock 
repurchases. Therefore, we capture any industry fixed effects by including dummy variables 
corresponding to 2 to 4-digit SIC codes. 
 
- AGE (as measured in Lemmon-Zender, 2003 and Bulan et al., 2003); 
 
We define age as the amount of time (in years) from the ﬁrms’ first positive stock price on 
Compustat-CRSP until the date of its initial repurchase. Knowing the IPO date allows us to 
study the evolution of financial decisions, including repurchases, as firms mature. We follow 
firms from the year of their IPO (between 1975 and 2002) until their first stock repurchase.  
 
 
 
 